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This thesis examines the Navy Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) to 
determine if reengineering principles can be applied to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of 
resource allocation. In particular it focuses on improving the Program Objectives Memorandum 
(POM) process. A comprehensive description and analysis of the current Navy PPBS process is 
provided. This thesis analyzes unique characteristics of the policies, procedures and organizations 
that have shaped the development of the Navy POM process, as well as the major external forces 
that have affected Navy PPBS. 
Process reengineering for the POM is evaluated against criteria represented in three resource 
allocation methodologies: Strategy-to-Tasks, Mission-Based resource allocation, and the General 
Staff Command. A description of each methodology is provided along with its application to the 
Navy POM and PPBS process. 
Organizational structure and resource allocation processes within DOD have been under 
constant scrutiny and revision since WWII. This thesis recommends a resource management 
method that provides for a fundamental redesign of the current PPBS process. Implementation of 
this methodology would have broad effects on DOD and Navy organizations, the roles and missions 
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The purpose of this thesis is to examine the Navy Planning, Programming 
and Budgeting System (PPBS) to determine if reengineering principles can be 
applied to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of resource allocation. In 
particular it will focus on improving the Program Objectives Memorandum (POM) 
process in the Programming phase of PPBS. The thesis concludes that central 
to this improvement is the implementation of reengineering and mission-based 
budgeting tenets in requirements, programs and financial decision-making. 
To recommend improvements to the PPBS it is first necessary to develop 
an accurate description of the current process. This thesis will attempt to 
provide such a description. It also will analyze the unique characteristics of 
Navy policies, procedures and organizations that have shaped development of 
the Navy POM process, as well as, the major external forces that have affected 
Navy PPBS. 
In October 1992, the Chief of Naval Operations reorganized the Navy 
headquarters staff (OPNAV). The three major resource sponsors (submarine, 
surface, and air) were consolidated under a single "Navy voice" for program 
direction-the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Resources, Warfare 
Requirements, and Assessment (N8). Prior to the reorganization, resource 
sponsors focused mainly on their roles as platform and warfare community 
advocates. Now a streamlined assessment process, premised on the 
1 
elimination of barriers among individual naval warfare communities and the 
services, has the benefit of expertise from all Navy and Marine Corps platforms 
and warfare disciplines to reach the best overall decision from both a Naval 
Service and joint service viewpoint. (Ref. 1, pp. 44-46) The OPNAV 
reorganization was implemented to end the traditional "warfare barons" and 
unproductive parochialism that characterized previous resource allocation 
decisions. Figure (1) illustrates the new OPNAV organization. 
Chief ofNaval Operations 
(NOO) 




N09C Public Affairs Support 
N09F Safety Matters Assistant DirNaval 
N09G Inspection Support VCNO Nuclear 
N09J Legislative Support Propulsion 
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Figure 1 CNO Staff Organization 
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This new assessment/planning process takes place under the purview of 
Joint Mission Area/Support Area ( JMA/SA) Assessments. The JMA/SA was 
designed to give a larger role to program planning during the Navy's PPBS. 
Additionally, establishment of the Resources and Requirements Review Board 
(R3B) in January 1993 by Vice Admiral William Owens (the first N8), with 
approval of the CNO, further streamlined the resource allocation process by 
disbanding ten formal headquarters boards. Now a three-tier committee review 
constitutes the Naval Service senior program and policy decision process (Ref. 
1, p. 47). The R3B serves as the focal point for assessing joint warfare mission 
and support areas of the Navy, determining warfare requirements and resource 
issues, and coordinating the planning, programming and budgeting process. 
Program and policy issues are continuously encountered in the Navy that 
affect the budget and the POM. It may be argued that a better, more symbiotic, 
relationship between programmers and budgeters should be developed. The 
Navy's current structure of a centralized planning and programming 
development process and decentralized budget development/execution may 
result in a variety of resource decision problems for the Navy. 
This thesis will attempt to provide a basis for a fundamental rethinking 
and possible reengineering of Navy programming and budgeting processes, 
perhaps similar in some ways to the OPNAV reorganization of 1992 and the 
establishment of the Resources and Requirements Review Board in 1993. It wilt 
focus on streamlining, eliminating redundancies and the overlap of processes to 
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ensure the most efficient and effective organization with special emphasis to the 
programming phase and budget formulation phase. The goal of the thesis is to 
determine if PPBS process change is desirable and feasible whi1e maintaining 
decision and process consistency and creating a smoother transition from 
Program Objective Memorandum to Budget Estimates Submission. 
B. BACKGROUND 
The purpose of the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System within 
the Department of the Navy (DON) is to obtain and provide the necessary Navy 
and Marine Corps forces and the associated resources to meet national military 
objectives. To ensure maximum effectiveness in obtaining needed forces and 
resources, it is the policy of the Secretary and Department of the Navy to 
decentralize programming and budgeting tasks while providing centralized policy 
guidance. It is assumed that involvement in program and budget formulation of 
organizations responsible for program and budget execution leads to the most 
effective combination of programs and resources for the Navy and Marine Corps, 
and results in a budget that allows execution to proceed effectively. (Ref. 2, p. 1) 
The current PPBS structure of the Navy should be examined to determine 
if it meets the goals that it advocates. Additionally, it should be examined to 
determine if it is the most efficient and effective method for the complex task of 
resource allocation with the Department of the Navy. 
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Program budgeting arose out of concern for the perceived deficiencies of 
traditional line-item budgeting. These deficiencies included: 
• The short-term focus of the budget. 
• The incremental nature and historical bias of the process and 
its outcomes. 
• The emphasis on organizational inputs rather than program outputs. 
• The excessive detail in budget documents. 
• The lack of relationship with government objectives. 
• The failure to provide a means of examining alternative methods for 
accomplishing objectives. 
• The failure to identify duplication of effort. (Ref. 3) 
In contrast to traditional budgeting, program budgeting is intended to 
provide a rational framework for decision-making to improve efficiency in the 
allocation of resources. The strengths of PPBS include: 
• A long-range planning perspective. 
• An emphasis on both quantitative and qualitative analysis at all 
stages of activity. 
• The use of aggregate data rather than line-item detail. 
• The use of program structures rather than organizational 
structures. 
• A basis for choosing between available and feasible alternatives 
for achieving objectives. (Ref. 4) 
Programming resource requirements for the outyears includes analyzing 
past, present and future resource requirements of Navy organizations and 
programs. Historical and current cost data are not readily available to the 
Programming divisions and Budget Formulation personnel do not actively 
participate in the POM formulation. Programmers are not involved in oversight 
of day-to-day operations of Navy organizations so they must depend on field 
activity budget personnel for cost projections. Extensive coordination between 
5 
the programmers and budgeters is required to ensure maximum utilization of 
available human and data resources. Intimate knowledge of how dollars are 
executed by organizational units could lessen the confusion, increase 
productivity and enhance efficiency in programming. Historically, programmers 
have reviewed programs almost unconstrained by resources, and budgeters 
have reviewed the need more closely for dollars in a specific year. A 
combination of the two is necessary to more effectively allocate Navy resources 
in competition with the other military departments and services. 
C. METHODOLOGY 
The methodology utilized in this study will include research into all 
applicable PPBS directives, instructions and publications from the Department of 
Defense (DOD) and Department of the Navy (DON). Interviews will be 
conducted with members of the Offices of the Secretary of the Navy and 
Defense, the Joint Staff, and the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. In 
addition, major claimants and operational commands will be interviewed to 
develop ideas and concepts on how to improve the POM and budget formulation 
processes. 
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II. PLANNING, PROGRAMMING, AND BUDGETING SYSTEM 
(PPBS) 
A. PPBS OVERVIEW 
The Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) is the primary 
process for decision-making and managing resources in the Department of 
Defense. PPBS was first introduced by Secretary of Defense Robert S. 
McNamara in 1962. Secretary McNamara brought the concept of program 
budgeting from the Rand Corporation where it had been developed in the 1950s. 
He was determined to be an active participant in preparing the DOD budget and 
in choosing the weapons to be developed and purchased by the military 
departments. Additionally, PPBS was implemented in an attempt to establish a 
system that would improve decision-making about the allocation of resources 
among a number of competing or possible programs and alternatives to 
accomplish specific national defense objectives. PPBS is intended to link 
national strategy goals to specific programs to an executable budget. (Ref. 5, pp. 
1-26) 
PPBS focuses on objectives and requirements, and what is necessary to 
meet them. PPBS, in concept, is a simple process. Based on the anticipated 
threat to national security objectives, a strategy is developed. Requirements 
to execute the strategy are then estimated and programs are developed 
consistent with the strategy. Finally, the costs of the approved programs are 
budgeted. (Ref. 6, p. C-2) Figure (2) illustrates PPBS in a linear format. 
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Figure 2 Basic PPBS Process [After Ref 6] 
Although there have been many changes to the PPBS structure over the 
years, the basic tenets of the system have remained: three interrelated but 
separate phases; program and budget guidance to the military services from the 
Secretary of Defense (SECDEF); and, the use of quantitative analysis to choose 
among competing programs. 
The Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) coordinates 
planning efforts for national security for both the civilian and military parts of the 
organization. PPBS translates force requirements developed by the National 
Military Strategy Document (NMSD) into programs which generate budgetary 
requirements which are then presented to Congress as part of the President's 
budget. 
The PPBS process operates year-round with each of three components of 
the procedure (planning, programming, and budgeting) working on various 
phases of the cycle. In reality, PPBS is not a linear process but an iterative, 
overlapping mechanism of assessment, review and decision all focused on one 
objective: to provide the operational commanders with the best mix of forces, 
equipment and support attainable within fiscal constraints. Figure (3) provides 
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It is important to remember that for the Department of the Navy, PPBS is 
used at three interconnected levels: the military service level (CNO/CMC); 
the Navy Secretariat level (SECNAV); and, the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense level (SECDEF). The DON is unique in that consists of two military 
services--the United States Navy and the United States Marine Corps. Because 
of this distinctive organizational framework, resource allocation becomes even 
more complicated. In the DON two POMs--one for the Navy and one for the 
Marine Corps-are produced. The two sets of resources described in their 
respective POMs are highly interdependent, as are the departmental 
appropriations that follow in the budget. For example, Navy appropriations 
procure and support Marine Corps aircraft. (Ref. 8, p. 9) These unique 
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organizational and resource arrangements, among other important differences, 
have resulted in a PPBS within the DON that is unlike any other within DOD 
(Ref. 9, p. 2). 
As outlined in Chapter 1, this thesis will focus on the Navy PPBS. 
Although, this thesis will not cover the details of Marine Corps POM 
development, it will discuss areas in which the two processes interconnect. The 
final integration of the two service POMs during the final phase, referred to as 
"end game," is a key to how well the overall process is working. A volatile end 
game where the Secretary of the Navy referees disputes may not result in a 
coherent program that will survive OSD scrutiny or inter-service challenges. 
A detailed examination of the Navy Planning, Programming and 
Budgeting phases is contained in Sections 81-83. An approximate schedule of 
key events in the DON PPBS is contained in Appendix A. A general overview 
of the Navy PPBS process is illustrated in Figure (4). 
1. Planning Phase 
In the planning phase of the PPBS, the military role and posture of the 
United States and the DOD in the world environment are examined, considering 
enduring national security objectives and the need for efficient management of 
resources. Shaping overall defense objectives, strategies, forces and policies is 
the responsibility of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, and the Unified Commanders (ClNCs). However, the Navy and the other 
services do play an important, yet subordinate, role in this process. 
10 
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Figure 4 Navy PPBS Overview [After Ref. 7] 
Much of what is the current Planning process has become is a result of 
passage of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act (PL 99-
433). This legislation made the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) the key 
military advisor to the President and the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF). It also 
increased the role of the Unified and Specified Commander-in-Chiefs (CINCs), 
linking their input on warfighting requirements into PPBS. (Ref. 10) Goldwater-
Nichols was designed to rectify perceived weaknesses in the Defense 
organizational structure and make national defense planning more efficient. 
Beginning with the National Security Strategy presented to and approved 
by the President and culminating in the Defense Planning Guidance 
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promulgated by SECDEF, the Planning phase sets the framework for resource 
allocation that will link the national security strategy to specific programs. 
a. Broad Overview of the Planning Strategy 
The Planning phase incorporates four major strategy steps 
(Ref. 6, C5-C6): 
• Identify National Interests 
• Examine the World Security Environment 
• Define the National Military Strategy 
• Plan Force Structure 
(1) Identify National Interests: National interests are 
primarily determined by the President after receiving input from a myriad of 
sources, including the State Department, the National Security Council, 
Congress, and other executive agencies. These national interests are 
incorporated into the National Security Strategy of the United States. 
(2) Examine World Security Environment: The basis for 
defense requirements in PPBS is premised on the collection and evaluation of 
strategic intelligence. With this information, the current and longer-term world 
security environment and the need for national defense is assessed. Assessing 
the environment includes consideration of short, medium and long-term threats 
to national interests, international defense policy objectives, and current defense 
status. 
Foreign policy objectives include international treaty 
commitments, such as NATO, and the access needed to various parts of the 
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world, such as the Middle East and Panama Canal. Threats are actions that 
would prevent accomplishments of foreign policy objectives. 
Threat evaluation in the context of our national security and 
that of our allies provides the basis for defining our defense needs. Once the 
overall threat to the security of the United States has been appraised, a national 
strategy for defense can be developed to counter the threat. The Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA), under the Office of the President, the Defense 
Intelligence Agency (DIA), under the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and SECDEF are 
responsible for assessing the environment at the national level. 
(3) Define National Military Strategy: After fully assessing 
the current world security environment, the next planning step is to determine 
the military strategy and force levels necessary to counter the threat and ensure 
that our defense policy objectives can be achieved. This step includes the 
following: 
• Develop idealized strategy and required force 
levels (resources unconstrained). 
• Apply pragmatic resource constraints. 
• Develop optimal force levels and strategy under these constraints. 
Define goals and objectives. 




{4) Plan Force Structure: Planning decisions documented in 
the form of guidance provide the policy and resource direction for the 
programming phase. The guidance that is developed during the planning phase 
and documented in the programming phase will prepare Navy commands and 
field activities to develop programs that will lead to the achievement of goals and 
objectives. 
b. Planning as a Phase of PPBS 
As a result of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the Chairman, Joint 
Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) has taken on a greater role in the Planning phase, 
namely, to ensure Commander-in-Chief {CINC) warfighting requirements are 
linked to the PPBS with fiscally constrained planning for all defense resources. 
The Goldwater-Nichols legislation established that CJCS is the principal military 
advisor to the President and the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), charged with 
the responsibility to advise on the overall allocation of defense resources, 
including requirements, programs and the budget (Ref. 1 0). The responsibilities 
of the CJCS and JCS are not limited to Planning only; they are also accountable 
for assessment and review of programs throughout the PPBS cycle. An 
overview of the planning process is shown in Figure (5). 
14 
l 
JOINT STRATEGY PLANNING 
SYSTEM 









SERVICE STRATEGY/POLICY INTEGRATED 
DOCUMENTS 1----+ JOINT MISSION AREAS 
Figure 5 Planning Process Overview [After Ref 7] 







J-5 (Strategic Plans and Policy) 
Office of Program Appraisal 
N3/5 (Plans, Policy, Ops) 
Plans, Policy and Operations 
(2) Framework of the Planning Phase: The Planning 
phase within the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) takes place in the framework of the 
Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS). The JSPS provides the means for 
the JCS to review the national security environment and objectives; evaluate the 
threat; assess current strategy and existing doctrine, and develop guidance for 
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proposed programs and budgets. JSPS provides both a forum and process for 
Planning that occurs within the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The objective of the JSPS 
is to blend military advice with political and fiscal considerations in providing 
strategic direction and sound programs. By law, the CJCS does not give 
guidance to the military departments and agencies to build their programs. 
Rather, he gives advice to the SECDEF on what those programs should include 
to maximize their effectiveness. (Ref. 11 , p. 11) 
Activities within the JSPS include operation of the 
Chairman's Readiness System that conducts the Joint Monthly Readiness 
Review (JMRR). The JMRR feeds readiness assessments into the Joint 
Warfighting Capabilities Assessments (JWCA). Teams from JWCA assess joint 
warfighting aspects of their respective areas and recommend strategies to CJCS 
for inclusion in the Chairman's Program Recommendation (CPR). Additionally, 
JSPS is the arena in which the National Military Strategy Document (NMSD) is 
formulated to provide advice to SECDEF from CJCS on national military 
objectives, force structure and support. 
The JSPS is not confined to "Planning" functions only. 
JWCA teams analyze Service POMs and CINC Integrated Priority Lists (IPLs), 
recommending areas for divesture and recapitalization to the Joint Requirements 
Oversight Council (JROC) for inclusion in the Chairman's Program Assessment 
(CPA). The JROC is chaired by the Vice Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff 
(VCJCS) and membership includes all service Vice Chiefs. The JROC ensures 
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the needs and deficiencies of Unified Commanders are addressed while 
ensuring interoperability and reducing parallel and duplicative efforts among the 
services. (Ref. 7, p. 55) The JCS assessment roles as well as the CINC IPLs 
will be examined in greater detail in the Programming section. 
(3) Key Planning Documents: The major documents that 
are used and/or produced during the planning phase are: 
• National Security Strategy of the United States. 
• National Military Strategy Document. 
• Chairman's Program Recommendation. 
• Defense Planning Guidance. 
The National Security Strategy (NSS) of the United States is 
authored by the President and provides a broad direction for defense planning 
and establishes the framework for defense planning to proceed. It is required by 
Section 603 of the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Department Reorganization Act 
(Ref. 10). The latest Presidential strategy is entitled "A National Security 
Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement" (February 1996). It elaborates a 
national security tailored for the new challenges the United States faces and 
builds upon America's strengths (Ref. 12, p. 1 ). The central goals are: 
• To enhance United States security with military forces that are ready to 
fight and with effective representation abroad. 
• To bolster America's economic revitalization. 
• To promote democracy abroad. 
Within these broad goals, the President identifies national interests and states 
his political, economic and defense strategies. The NSS describes the strategy 
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of engagement and enlargement in each of the world's regions. It illustrates the 
integration of America's commitment to the promotion of democracy and the 
enhancement of American prosperity with clearly defined security requirements 
to produce a mutually reinforcing policy. 
The National Military Strategy Document (NMSD) is 
authored by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and builds on 
President's National Security Strategy. The CJCS derives guidance from the 
National Security Strategy and, to a lesser degree, other high-level documents 
(e.g., Bottom Up Review by the SECDEF) to produce the NMSD. The NMSD 
identifies National Military Objectives and Strategic Concepts (Ref. 13, pp. 6-1 0). 
National Military Objectives include two central goals: promoting stability and 
thwarting aggression. Strategic Concepts include three main components: 
peacetime engagement, deterrence and conflict prevention, and fighting and 
winning wars. Additionally, two complementary strategic concepts are 
articulated: overseas presence and power projection. The NMSD provides force 
planning guidelines. It defines force requirements at the macro level. These 
include forces for overseas presence, forces for power projection, and forces 
required for winning two major regional conflicts (MRCs). 
The Joint Strategy Review (JSR) is a continuous process 
that takes place within the JSPS domain and relates to the NMSD. The JSR 
assesses the strategic environment for issues and factors that may affect the 
National Military Strategy (NMS) in the near-term or tong-range. It is an 
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annual report and serves as a bridge between the National Security Strategy 
and the National Military Strategy. The JSR begins to facilitate the integration 
of strategy, operational planning and programs. The JSR has Wide participation 
by the Joint Staff, CINCs, Services, DIA, OSD, academia, and think tanks (Ref. 
7' pp. 39-40). 
The Chairman's Program Recommendations (CPR) provide 
CJCS personal recommendations to SECDEF for consideration in formulating 
the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG). The Recommendations represent CJCS 
views of programs important for enhancing joint warfighting capabilities. The 
CPR establishes CJCS measures of effectiveness (MOEs) for assessing Service 
program efficiency. JWCA teams analyze the current military situation and make 
recommendations for inclusion in the CPR. The Chairman's Program 
Recommendations is a major input into the Defense Planning Guidance. 
The Defense Planning Guidance provides SECDEF 
planning guidance and fiscal constraints to the military departments and services 
for POM development. It provides a link between the Planning and 
Programming phases of PPBS. The principal drafter is the Under Secretary of 
Defense (Policy) with reviews and comments by the Services, CINCs and Joint 
Staff. The DPG freezes "Planning" phases for construction of the POM. The 
DPG is mainly derived from three inputs: the President's National Security 
Strategy, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's National Military Strategy 
Document (NMSD), and the Chairman's Program Recommendations (CPR). 
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The DPG plays a direct role in the PPBS as guidance for POM preparation. It 
specifically provides force and fiscal guidance to the services in order for the 
services to prepare their POMs. The DPG: 
• Defines the threat against which DOD programs are measured. 
• States national and defense policy objectives and strategy. 
• Provides resource and forces planning guidance. 
• Establishes the fiscal guidelines for the oncoming programming phase 
(Ref. 14, pp. 12-18). 
The DPG provides to the components of DOD the policy, 
force and fiscal guidance necessary to construct their respective program 
proposals and, ultimately, their annual budgets. The DPG provides fiscal 
guidance at the Total Obligational Authority (TOA) level for each of the services 
and defense agencies for the next six years. The fiscal guidance provides the 
overall constraint within which the services must construct programs. As such, 
the DPG is the yardstick by which the military departments and services make 
programming and budgeting decisions. Services develop their program 
proposals in accordance with the DPG while OSD and the Joint Staff use it as 
the baseline for program review. Once developed, the draft Defense Planning 
Guidance (DPG) is presented to the Secretary of Defense and to the CINCs of 
the unified commands. The CINCs have an opportunity to comment on the draft 
DPG and meet with SECDEF and the Defense Planning and Resource Board 
(DPRB) to discuss their views and recommendations. The DPRB assists the 
Secretary of Defense in major program decision making not only in the Planning 
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phase but also in the resolution of Program Review issues. Figure (6) 
delineates the membership of the DPRB. 
Defense Planning and Resources Board {DPRB) 
Deputy Secretary of Defense (Chairman) 
Executive Secretary: Director Program Analysis & Evaluation 
Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff (Vice Chairman) 
Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) 
Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) 
Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition) 
Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) 
Vice Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff 
Secretary of the Navy 
Secretary of the Army 
Secretary of the Air Force 
Figure (6) DPRB Members 
During development of the DPG, service inputs are also 
solicited, and draft copies are circulated for comment. As the Services raise 
issues during the review of the draft DPG, they are deliberated by the Defense 
Planning and Resources Board (DPRB). After the DPRB discusses the issues 
presented to it, it forwards recommendations to the SECDEF. 
After considering the views of the DPRB, the SECDEF 
makes final decisions and signs the DPG. Once the DPG is signed, the 
planning cycle is formally completed and the programming phase commences. 
The signed Defense Planning Guidance is the final product of the "Planning" 
phase of PPBS and the basis for the programming phase. 
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In summary, the Defense Planning Guidance contains the 
collective work of the SECDEF, CJCS, JCS, the Services, and the President. 
The DPG is the basis for the services to prepare their POM. While defense 
planning is continuous and iterative, the DPG "freezes" planning to enable 
construction of POMs, i.e., the DPG takes a single frame of reference point to 
enable programming to be accomplished (Ref. 7, p. 57). 
2. Programming Phase 
Programming is the process by which information in the Defense Planning 
Guidance (DPG) is translated into a financial plan of effective and achievable 
programs (Ref. 6, C-7). Programming produces a midrange plan for the DON. 
The programming phase results in the development of the POM, a detailed six 
fiscal year program-specific outline of how the Department of the Navy intends 
to spend its money and allocate manpower. 
a. Key Navy Staff 
Navy Staff is organized to conduct programming and budgeting 
process management within the NB organization. The Deputy Chief of Naval 
Operations (Resources, Warfare Requirements and Assessment) (N8) is the 
executive agent for the Navy PPBS. Under NB are: 
• Director, Programming Division (NBO) 
• Director, Assessment Division (N81) 
• Director, Fiscal Management Division (N82) 
N82 is "dual-hatted" in the Navy Secretariat as the Director, Office of Budget 
(FMB). 
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Other key players include: the Resources and Requirements 
Review Board (R3B), the Integrated Resources and Requirements Review Board 
(IR3B), R3B Executive Panel, Resource Sponsors, Appropriation Sponsors, Navy 
Staff Executive Steering Committee (ESC), and DON Program Strategy Board 
(DPSB). 
(1) Resources and Requirements Review Board (R3B): This 
board is the principal review forum in the revamped Navy program process. It is 
the Navy executive board for, " ... assessing joint warfare mission and support 
areas of the Navy, deciding warfare requirements and resource issues, and 
coordinating the planning, programming and budgeting process" (Ref. 15, p. 1 ). 
The R3B oversees the Joint Mission Area/Support Area (JMA/SA) assessment 
process that develops a consensus among the Navy's senior leadership about 
the size, structure and operating character of the future Navy (Ref. 16, pp. 5-6). 
Originally, the seven Joint Mission Area (JMA) and four Support Area (SA) 
assessment teams briefed the R3B, to review programs for modification or 
cancellation. The R3B then set direction and provided guidance regarding the 
recommendations arising out of the assessment process .. 
In July 1994, N8 issued a guidance memorandum for 
Program Review 1997 (PR 97) to revise the R3B to include more Marine Corps 
personnel (Ref. 17, p. 9). This was needed to ensure a more integrated 
approach to assessing Navy programs. The R3B with the increased Marine 
representation is now called the Integrated Resources and Requirements 
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Review Board (IR3B). This structure is designed so that the two Services 
participate in an integrated program planning process where inter-Service 
disagreements surface earlier than if the two Services prepared their POMs 
completely independently. Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Resources, 
Warfare Requirements and Assessments) (N8) and Marine Corps Deputy Chief 
of Staff for Programs and Resources (P&R) serve as co-chairs on the IR3B. 
Now, JWA/SA assessment briefs are presented to the IR3B. Briefs to the IR3B 
by N81 form the basis of the Investment Balance Review. 
The original R3B still presides over the "Navy only'' portion of 
the POM process including review of the Sponsor Program Proposals and 
examination of the Navy Tentative POM (TPOM). Figure (7) lists the members 
of the R3B. 
The R3B Executive Panel provides a forum in which the 
chairman of the R3B consults with other OPNAV leaders of comparable seniority 
on an issue prior to making a decision or referring an issue for decision to a 
higher level. It is not intended to serve as an additional forum to debate issues 
already decided at the R3B or other decision forum (Ref. 18, p. 2). Figure (8) 
lists the principals of the R3B Executive Panel. 
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Resources & Requirements Review Board Code Rank 
DCNO(Resources, Warfare Requirements & Assessments)(Chairman) NB *** 
Director, Programming Division NBO ** 
Director, Assessment Division N81 ** 
Director, Fiscal Management Division N82 ** 
Director, CINC Liaison Division N83 ** 
ACNO (Expeditionary Warfare Division) N85 ** 
ACNO (Surface Warfare) N86 ** 
ACNO (Submarine Warfare) N87 ** 
ACNO (Air Warfare) N88 ** 
Director, Special Programs Division N89 ** 
Director, Total Force Programming/Manpower N12 ** 
Asst DCNO (logistics) N4B ** 
Director, Strategy and Policy Division N51 ** 
Deputy Director, Naval Intelligence N2B 1):-equiv. 
Deputy Director, Space & Electronic Warfare N6B ** 
Deputy Director, Naval Training N7B ** 
Director on Navy Test & Eval & Tech Rqmts N091 ** 
Director of Naval Reserve N095 ** 
Oceanographer of the Navy N096 ** 
Commandant of the Marine Corps (Aviation) Marines ** 
Commandant of the Marine Corps (Rqmts & Programs) Marines ** 
Vice Commander, Naval Air Systems Command Air09/8 0 ** 
Vice Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command Sea09 ** 
Vice Commander, Space & Naval Warfare Systems Command 05 ** 
Chief of Information N09C ** 
Chief of Legislative Affairs OLA ** 
Director, Office of Program Appraisal OPA *** 
Figure 7 Resources and Requirements Review Board (R3B) 
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R38 Executive Panel Code Rank 
DCNO(Resources, Warfare Requirements & Assessments)(Chairman) 'NS ~~~ 
Director, Programming Division NSO ~~ 
Director, Assessment Division N81 ~~ 
Director, Fiscal Management Division N82 ~~ 
Director, CINC Liaison Division N83 ~~ 
DCNO (Plans, Policy and Operations) N3/N5 ~~~ 
DCNO (logistics) N4 ~~~ 
Commander, Naval Air Systems Command NAIR.OO ~~~ 
Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command SEA.OO ~~* 
Commander, Military Sealift Command NOO *** 
Director of Space and Electronic Warfare N6 ~~~ 
Naval Inspector General N09G ~~~ 
Director of Naval Training N7 ~-ec-ce 
Figure 8 R3B Executive Panel 
(2) Resource Sponsor: Resource Sponsors are the Navy 
staff, Deputy CNOs or Division Directors responsible for, " ... an identifiable 
aggregation of resources which constitute inputs to warfare and supporting 
tasks, such as air, surface or subsurface warfare" (Ref. 19, p. 1-23). The 
Resource Sponsors are responsible for groups of programs and program 
elements that comprise a warfare or support area. The Resource Sponsors are 
responsible for developing the programs under their cognizance during the 
programming phase. Specifically, they are provided guidance and Total 
Obligational Authority (TOA) levels to generate their portion of the POM input. 
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During the budgeting phase, they are responsible for providing the programmatic 
guidance to reconcile changes that occur due to repricing, rescheduling or other 
factors. Figure (9) lists the Navy Resource Sponsors: 
Resource Sponsor Sponsor Area 
DCNO (Manpower & Personnel) (N1) Manpower & Personnel 
DCNO (Manpower & Personnel) (N1) Family Housing/BOSIMILCON 
Director of Naval Intelligence (N2) Intelligence 
DCNO (Logistics) (N4) Logistics/Sb'ategic Sealift 
Director Space & Elecb'onic Warfare (N6) Space & Elecb'onic Warfare 
Director of Naval Training (N7) Training 
Director Assessment Division Assessment Studies 
Director Expeditionary Warfare (N85) Expeditionary Warfare 
Director Surface Warfare Division (N86) Surface Warfare 
Director Submarine Warfare Division (N87) Submarine Warfare 
Director Air Warfare (N88) Air Warfare 
Director Navy Test & Eval & Tech Rqmts (N091) Science & Tech/Test & Eval 
Surgeon General of the Navy (N093) Medical 
Oceanographer of the Navy (N096) Oceanography 
Assistant VCNO (N09B) Adminisb'ation 
Figure 9 Navy Resource Sponsors 
(3) Appropriation Sponsor: An Appropriation Sponsor is a 
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (DCNO), Assistant Chief of Naval Operations 
(ACNO) or Deputy Chiefs of Staff (DCS) responsible for supervisory control over 
a designated appropriation. Once a program is defined that provides for force 
level requirements and program objectives, the appropriation sponsor becomes 
the DON spokesman on matters dealing with resource requirement. This 
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involves assisting program and resource sponsors in dealing with funding 
deficiencies during budget formulation, testifying before Congress, and 
recommending reprogramming of funds within appropriations during budget 
execution. (Ref 19, p. 1-23) Appropriation Sponsors are listed in Figure (10). 
Appropriation Sponsors Code Appropriation 
Director, Fiscal Management Division N82 Other Procurement, Navy (OPN) 
Director, Fiscal Management Division N82 Operations & Maintenance, Navy (O&M,N) 
ACNO (Surface Warfare) N86 Ships Conversion, Navy (SCN) 
ACNO (Surface Warfare) N86 Weapons Procurement, Navy (WPN) 
ACNO (Air Warfare) N88 Aircraft Procurement, Navy (APN) 
DCNO (Manpower & Personnel) N1 Military Personnel, Navy (MPN) 
DCNO (Logistics) N4 Military Construction (MILCON) 
DCNO (Logistics) N4 National Defense Sealift Fund (NDSF) 
DCNO (Logistics) N4 Family Housing, Navy (FH,N) 
Director Navy Test/Eval & Tech Rqmts N091 Research, Development, Test/Eva! (RDT&E) 
Director of Naval Reserve N095 Military Construction, Naval Reserve (MCNR) 
Director of Naval Reserve N095 Reserve Personnel, Navy (RPN) 
Director of Naval Reserve N095 Operations & Maintenance, Navy Res (O&M,NR) 
Figure 10 Navy Appropriation Sponsors 
( 4) Navy Staff Executive Steering Committee (ESC): The 
purpose of this committee is to provide policy recommendations to the CNO on 
issues that have limited resource or warfighting implications. Although not a 
component of the CNO executive decision making process, the Navy Staff 
Executive Steering Committee may recommend that issues be sent to either the 
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CNO Executive Board (CEB) or the Resources and Requirements Review Board 
(R3B). The composition of this informational forum is established by the Vice 
Chief of Naval Operations (VCNO) (Ref. 18, p. 1 ). 
(5) DON Program Strategy Board (DPSB): This high-level 
board meets periodically to review and assess important events during the Navy 
PPBS such as Summary Brief of JWA/SA assessments and the Investment 
Balance Review (IBR). The DPSB oversees the final integration of Navy and 
Marine Corps POMs into a total DON package for submission to OSD. DPSB 
members are listed in Figure (11): 
DON Program Strategy Board (DPSB) 
Secretary of the Navy (Chairman) 
Chief of Naval Operations 
Commandant of the Marine Corps 
Under Secretary of the Navy 
Vice Chief of Naval Operations 
Asst Commandant of the Marine Corps 
Asst Secretary of the Navy (RD&A) 
Asst Secretary of the Navy (I&E) 
Asst Secretary of the Navy (M&RA) 
Asst Secretary of the Navy (FM&C) 
Director, Office of Program Appraisal 
Figure 11 DPSB members 
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b. Key Navy Programming Documents 
(1) Program Objectives Memorandum (POM): The POM is 
the Secretary of the Navy's biennial recommendation to the SE9DEF for the 
detailed programmatic application of Department of Navy resources. The POM 
contains information on all Navy programs planned for a six year period. The 
first two years of the POM will later be translated into the Secretary of the Navy's 
budget that becomes part of the President's budget submitted to Congress after 
OSD and SECDEF review and approval. The last four years are used as the 
starting point for the next POM after updating to reflect new initiatives and 
adherence to new planning guidance. POMs are constructed during even 
numbered years to reflect the biennial DOD budget. In odd years a Program 
Review is conducted to update any changes to the POM. 
(2) Future Years Defense Program (FYDP): The FYDP is 
the basic DOD programming document. It is a publication of decisions 
approved by SECDEF on the DOD program for a six year period. The FYDP is 
an integrated program document that displays forces, costs, manpower, 
procurement and construction in the approved programs (Ref. 6, p. C-14). Data 
is constructed in two ways: Major Force Programs (for DOD review) and 
Appropriation (for Congressional review). This two-dimensional structure 
provides a comprehensive approach to accounting for, estimating, identifying, 
and allocating resources to individual or logical groups of organizational entities, 
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major combat force or support programs referred to as program elements 




FEB (Pres. Budget), May (POM), Oct (BES) 
FEB (Pres. Budget) Oct (BES) 
(3) Resource Allocation Display (RAD): The RAD is a 
computerized spreadsheet display showing the allocation of Navy resources. 
The RAD is updated many times during the programming phase and reflects the 
most current FYDP data. RADs are numbered I to XII signifying different stages 
of the programming and budgeting cycle. The final RAD is the Navy POM as it 
is submitted to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Odd numbered RADs are 
sorted by and issued to Resource Sponsors; even numbered RADs are issued to 
Claimants. 
c. Programming Sub-phases 
There are three distinct yet interrelated subphases within the 
programming phase. They are: 
• Program Assessment 
• POM Development 
• POM Delivery & OSD Program Review 
The programming subphases translate planning for forces and fiscal guidance 
into achievable programs. Programmers start with the program years (the last 
four years of the previous POM cycle) and revise and update past estimates 
rather than developing programs from scratch. 
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(1) Program Assessment: Program Assessment primarily 
serves to appraise warfare and support programs and to assess the state of the 
Navy. The Navy assessment process is led by the Director, Assessment 
Division (N81 ). The purpose of this process is to provide a continuous review of 
Navy program joint warfighting and forward presence capabilities and its 
resource requirements. The assessment process provides an integrated review 
of DON requirements and resources. The results of this assessment are 
reflected in subsequent decisions on programming priorities. (Ref. 21, p. 1) 
The programming assessment process begins with the 
issuance of POM Serial One. The POM serials are a series of memorandums 
from N80 to all offices participating in the development of the POM. POM Serial 
One provides initial guidance for preparing the Navy Program Objectives 
Memorandum (POM). Procedures and documentation requirements for each 
major event in the POM cycle are provided in subsequent POM serials (Ref. 22, 
p. 1 ). The actual assessment work really begins a few months before issuance 
of POM Serial One, however, POM Serial One formally provides initial 
documentation and schedules for the upcoming POM. Figure (12) illustrates 




POM Joint Mission/Support 












Priority List (IPL) 
Figure 12 Program Planning Sub-phase Overview [After Ref 7] 
CINC Maritime Concerns provide the Unified Commanders 
an opportunity to address top maritime issues at the beginning of the 
programming assessment phase for future consideration during the Joint 
Mission Area/Support Area (JMAISA) assessments. The Unified Commanders 
are as follows: 
• European Command • Atlantic Command 
• Pacific Command • Central Command 
• Southern Command • Space Command 
• Special Operations Command • Transportation Command 
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The Baseline Assessment Memorandum (BAM) provides 
independent analysis of the funding required to reach specified levels of 
capability for a particular program (e.g., ship depot maintenance, spares 
funding). These assessments address programs that cut across several 
resource sponsors. The purpose of the BAM is three-fold: (1) to aid Resource 
Sponsors in determining appropriate funding levels during Sponsor Program 
Proposal (SPP) development; (2) to assist in developing POM Preliminary 
Programming Guidance; and (3) to provide a vehicle for conducting a post-SPP 
Assessment of how allocated resources meet requirements and POM 
Preliminary Programming Guidance. (Ref. 22, p. 2) 
BAMs provide Resource Sponsors with baseline costs for 
projected force levels and specific programmatic support requirements. As the 
reference against which Resource Sponsors measure their proposed programs, 
BAMs provide the programming process with the most current budget decision 
and execution data. They are a rigorous and independent assessment of critical 
or necessary funding requirements. Figure (13) lists the Baseline Assessment 
Sponsors. 
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Assessment Area Sponsor 
Ship Depot Maintenance N4 
Ship Intermediate Maintenance N4 
Ship Inactivation N4 
Spares N4 
Shore Environmental Quality Program N4 
Afloat Environmental Quality Program N4 
DON Environmental Restoration N4 
Base Operating Support N4 
Military Construction N4 
Family Housing N4 
Non-Nuclear Ordnance Procurement/ N4 
Maintenance 
DON BRAC Execution N4 
Training Technology N7 
Manpower and Personnel N1 
Base Information Infrastructure N6 
Fagure 13 Baseline Assessment Area Sponsors 
CINC Integrated Priority Lists (IPLs) provide CINCs with a 
process to submit prioritized issues to the programming phase. Input is by 
means of the Integrated Priority Lists (IPLs) submitted per OSD direction. After 
receipt of the Unified CINCs' IPLs, Component Commanders submit Component 
Issue Papers (CIPs) as a reference, providing programmatic background and 
focus for IPL issues (Ref. 22, p. 4). Component Commanders may also input no 
more than five of their own non-IPL concerns. OPNAV responds to these 
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Component Commander issue papers in Sponsor Program Proposal (SPP) and 
Sponsor Program Proposal Documents (SPPDs} (Refs. 23, p. 1; 24, p. 1 ). 
CINCs are not limited in the number of issues that can be 
submitted, nor are they required to identify offsets, as are the claimants. 
Concerns addressed by the CINCs must be answered in the POM, and resource 
sponsors must identify action taken on each issue. 
Joint Mission Area/Support Area (JMAISA) Assessments 
provide the basis for discussion of program validity and tradeoffs for senior Navy 
leadership. These are designed to cut across the concerns of traditional 
platform and naval warfare areas and employ new capabilities for evaluating 
cost and benefits of proposed alternatives. Assessments support development 
of a DON investment strategy based on established and developing concepts for 
the employment of Naval Forces, mission/capability priorities, as well as DON 
standards for support, training, readiness and manpower (Ref. 21, pp. 1-2). 
The goals of the JMAISA process are to: 
• Build a consensus as to the future size, structure, and character 
of the Navy. 
• Incorporate a new joint perspective to Navy force planning. 
• Achieve closer Navy-Marine Corps integration. 
• Shift planning priorities toward littoral warfare. 
• Minimize the disruptive forces that would result from decreases in 
the defense budget. (Ref. 25, p. 20) 
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The JMA/SA teams complete their portion of the assessment 
process with briefs to the IR3B. At this point, N81 creates the first proposal for 
the Investment Balance Review (IBR). The JMA/SA establish the explicit link 
between required joint operational capabilities and Navy-Marine Corps programs 
and budget (Ref. 1, p. 47). The DON JMA/SA groups are a parallel version of the 
JCS Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment (JWCA) teams. Figure (14) 
shows the DON JMA/SA areas. 
Wargaming has achieved a new emphasis as a decision 
process tool. Wargames are a medium in which program planners can explore 
the interactions of systems and operational concepts in specific scenarios. 
Wargaming has become an integral part of the evaluation of Joint Mission 
Area/Support Area assessments emphasizing program balance and potential 
tradeoffs. It is utilized by programmers to assess capabilities versus DPG 
scenarios and strategic concepts. 
Investment Balance Review (IBR) is led by N81. It is the 
culmination of the JMAISA assessment review process and compiles all the 
JMA/SA recommendations into a single program for discussion, review and 
approval by the IR3B. The IBR is also briefed by N81 to the CINCs, CEB and 
DPSB. The IBR provides a broad framework from which to commence the more 
detailed level of programming required to produce a justifiable POM. The IBR 
serves as the critical bridge between program planning and POM development. 
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Joint Mission Area Lead 
Joint Strike NBS 
Joint Littoral Warfare NBS 
.. 
Intelligence, Surveillance, & Reconnaissance (ISR) N87 
Nuclear Deterrence/Counterproliferation of Weapons N87 
Of Mass Destruction 
Maritime Support of Land Forces (MLSF) N86/N42 
Forward Engagement/Conventional Deterrence (FED) N51 
Command, Control, Communications, Computers and N6B 
Information Warfare 
Support Areas 
Manpower and Personnel N12 
Readiness N81 
Support and Infrastructure (S&I) N4B 
Training N7B 
Other Teams 
Special Programs N89 
Force Structure & Presence N81 
Non-Acquisition RDT&E N091 
Figure 14 DON JWA/SATeams 
The IBR results serve as direct input into the Department of 
the Navy Programming Guidance (DONPG) and N80 Preliminary Programming 
Guidance (PPG) (Ref.16, pp. 39-41). Completion of the IBR is the end of the 
"program planning" phase and the commencement of the program development 
phase. 
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Program Assessment/Planning Summary: Assessments 
are intended to provide the basis for development of a DON strategy based on 
established and developing concepts for the employment of Naval Forces, 
mission/capability priorities, as well as service or common DON standards for 
support, training, readiness and manpower. Assessments and the subsequent 
Investment Balance Review (IBR) analyze and balance those DON warfighting, 
crisis response, and support capabilities required to fulfill the naval services' 
roles in execution of the national military strategy. They provide options to the 
DON leadership for program alternatives that compare opportunities and costs 
for accomplishing various capabilities. The process should develop a DON 
investment strategy that properly supports the highest-priority naval capabilities. 
(2) POM Development: The POM Development phase 
begins with the issuance of the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) by the 
SECDEF. Specifically for the Navy, the development phase begins upon 
completion of the Investment Balance Review (IBR). The development of the 
Navy POM is guided by the Director, Programming Division (N80). Figure (15) 
illustrates the POM development sub-phase of Programming. 
The first step in the POM development process is delivery 
by N80 of the Preliminary Program Guidance (PPG), one of many POM serials 
(Ref. 26, pp. 1-2). The PPG documents initial investment guidance for Navy 
programs based on results of DON JMAISA Assessments and the IBR. It will 














[After Ref 7] 
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development of Sponsor Program Proposals (SPPs) (Ref. 26, p. 1). N80 will 
consider Unified CINC, Component Commander and Claimant input in writing 
this guidance. Hence, the PPG is the blueprint for POM development (Ref. 22, 
p. 2). 
NBO provides revised programming and fiscal guidance as 
appropriate after issuance of DOD Fiscal Guidance and the Defense Planning 
Guidance (DPG) . The Fiscal Guidance provided by the Secretary of the 
Defense will distribute shares to the military departments and establish Total 
Obligational Authority (TOA) controls for each year of the FYDP. 
Upon receipt of the PPG, Resource Sponsors will adjust 
their programs to meet prescribed fiscal and programmatic direction. This is 
also the Sponsor's opportunity to make technical corrections, fact-of-life cost 
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adjustments and other zero-sum changes within the bounds of their fiscal 
guidance to reflect program changes (Ref. 22, p. 2). 
Changes made by the Resource Sponsors, as a result of 
fiscal and programmatic guidance will comprise the Sponsor Program 
Proposals (SPPs). SPPs represent the major initial proposals for the Navy 
POM. Resource Sponsors use the latest fiscal and planning guidance on 
program changes to adjust and update their programs. The SPPs are the 
sponsors allocation of their resources to support Navy objectives as adjusted by 
the PPG. They must also address the results of the IBR, the CINC IPLs, and 
Component Commander and Claimant Issue Papers. In odd year Program 
Reviews, Resource Sponsors will submit Sponsor Change Proposals (SCPs) to 
document any changes or adjustments to the original POM submission. 
Claimant Issue Papers provide major claimants, such as 
Commander-in-Chief Atlantic Fleet (CINCLANTFL T), Naval Air Systems 
Command (NAVAIR) or Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP), the 
opportunity to participate in the Resource Sponsor SPP development. Each 
claimant may identify 25 prioritized issues (maximum of five per Resource 
Sponsor) and must accompany each with program/financial offsets. Claimant 
issues are routed to the Resource Sponsors for consideration and disposition. 
The Resource Sponsor will respond to the five issues within their sponsorship in 
the Sponsor Program Proposal Document (SPPD) (Ref. 24, pp. 1-3). 
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SPPs are then briefed to the R3B and addresses the 
program necessary to meet POM program and fiscal guidance and show/explain 
the effect of those changes on Resource Sponsor program baselines. 
Sponsor Program Proposal Documents (SPPDs) are developed by the 
Resource Sponsors documenting their presentations and are submitted to N83 
in response to Component Commander Issue Papers or to N80 in response to 
Claimant Issue Papers. They must address the Component Commander's 
issues in programmatic detail (Ref. 23, p. 2). They must also address each 
Claimant's top five issues in programmatic detail (Ref. 24, p. 3). 
Following the SPPs, designated resource sponsors prepare 
Post-SPP Assessments. These are written reports that provide an evaluation 
of programs as proposed in SPPs. Post-SPP Assessments analyze the degree 
to which SPPs meet Preliminary Program Guidance and BAM recommendations. 
The Baseline Assessment Sponsor highlights any significant funding 
deficiencies and provides appropriate recommendations to N80. 
Completion of SPPs, SPPDs and Post-SPP Assessments is 
followed by presentations to the R38 by the Resource Sponsors. After reviewing 
the SPPs for compliance with guidance, the R3B makes its adjustments to the 
SPPs. Changes to the SPPs are called "ZOWs" (an acronym for "Zumwalt's 
Own Words", originating when the former CNO would make unilateral decrees 
on programming issues sometimes to the chagrin of his staff officers). N80 then 
compiles the SPPs into a complete POM proposal. The complete program is 
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briefed to the Navy Staff Executive Steering Committee, and then to the CNO 
Executive Steering Committee (ESC) for decisions on policy issues. Following 
this, the CNO then approves the Navy Tentative POM (T-POM). This OPNAV 
internal review is also referred to as the Navy "end game," as it occurs at the 
end of the programming process within the Navy only phase. 
The Navy program is then combined with the Marine Corps 
program and briefed to the DPSB (refer to figure 11) by N80 and Deputy Chief of 
Staff (Programs and Resources), USMC. During the DPSB meeting, concerns of 
Navy Secretariat are addressed. Upon completion of the review by the DPSB, 
and approval by SECNAV, the official DON POM is submitted to the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense (Appendix 8 provides a schedule for POM-98). Although 
submission of the DON POM to OSD is the end to the DON programming phase 
many of the same players will be involved in the OSD program review that 
follows. 
(3) POM Delivery and OSD Program Review: The 
submission of the POM to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) signals 
the beginning of the issue development and defense program review by OSD 
under the purview of the Defense Planning and Resource Board (DPRB) 
(Figure 6) and the Program Review Group (PRG). Figure (16) outlines the 
POM delivery and OSD review sub-phase. 
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Review 
Figure 16 POM Delivery and OSD Program Review Sub-phase [After Ref 7] 
The DPRB assists the SECDEF in major program decision 
making. The DPRB is involved throughout the PPBS process, most importantly 
in preparation of the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) and in the resolution of 
Program Review issues. 
The Program Review Group (PRG) serves as a subordinate 
group to the DPRB. Its purpose is to screen and develop issues before they are 
deliberated by the DPRB (Ref. 27, Attachment A, p.2). Figure (17) shows the 
PRG membership. 
Program issues are major program items designated by the 
Deputy Secretary of Defense (DEPSECDEF) requiring high-level attention. 
Aside from those issues raised by DEPSECDEF, issues raised by any DPRB 
member, any defense senior executive responsible for a portion of the defense 
program, or CINC can be addressed in an Issue Paper. These issues are 
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Program Review Group 
- Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E) (Chairman) 
- Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) 
-Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense(Acquisition and Technology) 
-Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management Policy) 
-Assistant Secretary of Defense (Strategy and Requirements) 
- Assistant Secretary of Defense (C31) 
-Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) 
-Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) 
-Army Deputy Chief of Staff (Operations and Plans) 
- Navy Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (N8) 
-Marine Corps Deputy Chief of Staff {Programs and Resources} 
-Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff (Plans and Operations) 
-Joint Staff Director for Force Structure, Resources and Assessment (J-8) 
. F1gure 17 Program Revrew Group (PRG) Membershrp 
reviewed by Assistant Secretary of Defense (Program Analysis and Evaluation) 
(DPA&E) for possible consideration by the PRG. 
Issue Development Teams are designated to lead the 
development and evaluation of those issues that DEPSECDEF has selected for 
review as Major Issues. Teams contain members from OSD, Joint Staff and the 
military department with the team leader being from OSD or the Joint Staff. The 
Issue Teams formulate a set of alternatives for decision. Alternative I is always 
the POM position (Ref. 27, p. 2). Issue Teams brief the PRG initially on how 
they framed their issue for study. The PRG provides guidance if further work on 
. the issue is required, or if the issue is ready to be presented to the DPRB for 
decision. 
45 
Issues presented in the form of Issue Papers to DPA&E are 
assembled into an Issue Decision Book which are circulated to PRG members. 
The Issue Books reflect the OSD position, CINC input and ser-Vice position 
(reclama). DEPSECDEF decides issues presented in the Decision Book. 
SECDEF decides the Major Issues and, along with 
DEPSECDEF's decisions on the issues in the Decision Book, announce them in 
the form of a Program Decision Memorandum (PDM) to the military departments 
and defense agencies, with instructions to submit their budgets in accordance 
with those decisions. Figure (18) illustrates a flow chart of the OSD Program 
Review. The PDM officially modifies the service POM inputs and provides OSD 
approved baseline to commence budget formulation. The PDM is the closing 
document of the DOD programming phase. 
3. Budgeting Phase 
A budget may be defined as a document that expresses in financial terms 
the plan for accomplishing organization objectives for a specified period of time. 
It is an instrument for planning, decision-making, and management control, as 
well as a statement of priorities. The budgeting phase of PPBS is where 
programmatic demands must be matched by dollars. The somewhat "relaxed" 
financial constraints applied in the Planning and Programming phases tighten 
under Budget Authority (BA) and Total Obligational Authority (TOA) controls. 
Inherent in the Department of Navy budget process is the basic policy that the 
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DEPSECDEF initial list of 
"Major Issues" 
IDTframes 
issue for study 
PRGreviews 
study design 
Attach to related "Major Issue" 
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*IDT- Issue Development Team 
offices responsible for executing budgets should participate in developing 
budget estimates, subject to the guidance and decisions of higher authority e.g., 
the CNO and SECNAV. The first two years of the approved POM forms the 
baseline for creation of service budgets. These two years reflect the 
Congressional requirement in the FY 86 Defense Authorization Act to submit a 
biennial budget commencing with FY 1988/1989. The budgeting function in the 
DON rests with the Office of Budget (FMB) in the Navy Secretariat, under the 
Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Financial Management and Comptroller 




A uniquely Navy arrangement gives another title to the Director of Budget. 
In addition to his responsibility for the entire DON budget, he is also Director of 
the Fiscal Management Division (N82) and reports to the Deputy Chief of Naval 
Operations (Resources, Warfare Requirements and Assessment) (N8). In this 
capacity, he provides assistance to the Chief of Naval Operations in (1) ensuring 
that Navy programmatic needs are considered in developing DON financial 
management systems; (2) providing information and advice on the formulation, 
review, justification, and execution of the DON budget; (3) ensuring compliance 
with DON financial policy and procedures (Ref. 8, p. 12). Thus, N82 reports to 
both SECNAV and the CNO and OPNAV. 
The budget expresses the financial requirements necessary to support 
and execute approved programs developed during the preceding planning and 
programming phases. The budgeting phase consists of two major steps: 
budget formulation and budget presentation and review. 
a. Budget Formulation 
The first step in the Budget Formulation phase is issuance of the 
Budget Guidance. The Budget Guidance consists of the following (Ref. 7, p. 
138-139): 
• DON Budget Guidance Manual (BGM) (NAVCOMPTINST 71 02.2C/01 
May 1995). The BGM is the authoritative source of information with 
respect to budget formulation and presentation of the DON budget. The 
primary purpose of the manual is to provide detailed guidance to 
budget submitting organizations for the preparation and submission of 
the budget estimates and preparation of requests for reconsideration in 
response to budget adjustments made by higher authority. 
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• Budget Guidance Series 
Notices published prior to each major budget submission and 
supplements the DON Budget Guidance Manual. 
• Memorandums 
Specific budget review schedules and related guidance. 
• NAVCOMPT Manual, Volume 7 (Budgeting) 
Directions for administration of appropriations and defines financial 
responsibilities. 
• NAVCOMPT Notices 7111 
Supplements standard guidance and procedures contained in the DON 
Budget Guidance Manual (NAVCOMPTINST 7102.2C) including 
specific submission and review dates. 
Budget Formulation essentially is the process of turning the POM 
into a budget. Figure (19) provides a comparison of the POM and budget 
highlights(Ref. 7, p.141): 
POM Budget 
Focus on major DON programs Focus on each DON Program 
Resources Sponsors Budget Submitting Offices 
Gross$ More precise pricing 
Program Decision Memorandum Presidenfs Budget 
By Mission By Appropriation 
Figure 19 POM/Budget Comparison 
Budget requests are prepared by Budget Submitting Offices 
(BSOs). BSOs convert from program to appropriation categories. BSOs are 
major claimants and Program Offices that submit their budget estimates directly 
to the Navy Comptroller. BSOs are tasked to prepare estimates based on 
SECNAV programs as requested in the POM. The BSOs develop and submit 
budget estimates in conformance with the latest guidance, and ideally, the 
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current POM input. The POM, however, is not perfect. The BSOs are the first to 
feel its inadequacies and additional pressure is placed on the BSOs to fix 
"shortfalls and problems" in the POM. 
b. Budget Presentation and Review 
After budgets are prepared by Budget Submitting Offices, two 
reviews occur: (1) DON review and (2) Joint OSD/OMB review. 
(1) DON Review: The Department of the Navy budget 
review compiles and transforms individual budgets of various offices within the 
Department into a "balanced" Departmental budget. It provides the Secretary of 
the Navy and senior advisors an opportunity for decision-making and control of 
the financial resources of the Department. Although it must conform to the 
policy, programmatic, and budgetary guidance of the Secretary of Defense, the 
budget is a statement of the DON priorities and contains the financial plan for 
achieving the Navy objectives. The key issue in budget review is the 
executability of programs, plans and activities within the fiscal year. 
After receipt of the BSOs budget estimates, NAVCOMPT 
budget analysts conduct hearings to gather information to gain a greater 
understanding of the particular budget they are reviewing. NAVCOMPT analysts 
may have several programs to review and must have a thorough knowledge 
about program feasibility and executability. Analysts examine the submissions 
to ensure that they conform to the most recent guidance, are priced using the 
latest cost factors, and do not place resources at risk by allocating funds to 
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programs that may have changed since POM submission. Navy goals for 
budget review are to ensure: best pricing, best schedule, strong justification, 
requirement for fund availability during budget fiscal year, dollar and manpower 
balance, timely execution of funds and consistency. The budget must reflect 
changes driven by the POM, congressional reductions, PDMs and OMB/OSD 
fiscal guidance. 
The next step in the DON budget formulation is a process 
unique to the DON. NAVCOMPT staff conducts a formal Markup and Reclama 
Review. The markups are recommended adjustments to programs in the budget 
estimates. The BSOs, Appropriation Sponsors and Resource Sponsors are 
given the opportunity to respond to markups through the Reclama process. If a 
claimant does not agree with a markup, it also submits a reclama. Required 
turnaround for reclamas is quick; only 24-48 hours. If no reclama is submitted, 
the mark is considered final. If a reclama is submitted, it is resolved at the 
lowest level at which an agreement can be reached. Since marks are signed by 
the NAVCOMPT division directors, the majority of disagreements are resolved at 
that level. If an issue cannot be resolved at the division director level, it is 
forwarded to the Director, Office of Budget (FMB). If the issue is not resolved at 
this level, FMB meets with the DCNO (Resources, Warfare Requirements and 
Assessment)(N8). 
Upon completion of the mark and reclama review process, 
NAVCOMPT assembles the budget exhibits into a complete budget for 
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submission to the Secretary of the Navy for final approval. Figure (20) shows 
the general timeline of DON budget presentation and review. Once approved, 
the budget is submitted by SECNAV to OSD for the OSD/OMB.'budget review. 
DON Budget Review Events Timeframe 
Budget Guidance is issued April/May 
Exhibits are prepared and submitted May/July 
Exhibits are reviewed and analyzed July/August 
Hearings are conducted July/August 
Marks are recommended July/August 
Reclamas are submitted and reviewed July/August 
Decisions are made August 
Meetings are held to resolve outstanding issues August 
SECNAV presentation August 
Approved DON budget is submitted to OSD September 
Figure 20 DON Budget Review Schedule [After Ref. 7] 
(2) OSD/OMB Budget Review: The OSD/OMB budget 
review cycle is very similar to the DON budget review. Figure (21) outlines the 
OSD/OMB budget review cycle. 
The joint budget review conducted by the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) transforms 
the DON budget into part of the DOD budget and then into part of the 
President's Budget. This review provides the final control and decision-making 
opportunities for both the SECDEF and the President, prior to submission of the 
budget to Congress. 
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050/0MB Budget Review Events Timeframe 
Budget Guidance is issued August 
Exhibits are prepared and submitted September 
Exhibits are reviewed and analyzed Sept/Oct 
Hearings are conducted Sept/Oct 
PBDs/DMRDs are recommended Oct/Dec 
Reclamas are submitted and reviewed Oct/Dec 
Decisions are made Nov/Dec 
MBI meetings are held to resolve issues Nov/Dec 
SECDEF discussion with President December 
Approved budget submitted as Pres Budget February 
Figure 21 OSD/OMB Budget Review Schedule [After Ref. 7] 
SECDEF holds a series of budget hearings jointly with OMB 
on the DOD component requests. These hearings are used by SECDEF to 
formulate his Program Budget Decisions (PBDs) and Defense Management 
Report Decisions (DMRDs). PBDs are similar to the PDM issues in that they 
provide alternatives to the service proposals. DMRDs seek to achieve 
economies and efficiencies through management reform in one of three ways: 
changes in business practices (e.g., Defense Business Operations Fund-
DBOF); consolidation efforts (e.g., Supply Centers); or changes in management 
practices (e.g., reduction of SECNAV staff) (Ref. 7, p. 150). 
In the Department of the Navy, responses to PBDs are 
coordinated by the FMB. Draft copies of PBDs are circulated to the services the 
same time they are given to OSD so that most issues may be resolved before 
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the PBDs are signed. The OSD reclama process differs from the Navy review in 
that all responses are written and there are no face-to-face hearings. Despite 
that, the reclama process still gives the departments and milita·ry services an 
opportunity to appeal a decision by the Office of Secretary of Defense. Once a 
PBD is signed, it is incorporated into the Budget Estimate Submission (BES) for 
inclusion in the President's Budget. The military departments have one last 
opportunity to appeal decisions made by PBDs. The appeal is made in the 
Major Budget Issue (MBI) series. MBis are issues that the services deem vitally 
important to their effective operation. These issues are briefed to the DPRB by 
the service secretaries and chiefs. They are then decided upon by SECDEF 
and DEPSECDEF. The DOD budgeting phase is completed when the President 
sends his budget (with DOD input) to Congress in February each year. 
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Ill. PRINCIPLES OF REENGINEERING 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In the last six years, "Business Process Reengineering'r (BPR) or, more 
commonly, just "Reengineering" has emerged as a significant management 
movement. Its basic concept is simple: revolutionary advances in business 
processes and information technology make possible comprehensive changes in 
the way companies operate, resulting in quantum improvements in efficiencies 
and effectiveness (Ref. 28, pp. 1 04-112). 
The foundation principles of modern organizations were established over 
two hundred years ago by, among others, Adam Smith in his book, The Wealth 
of Nations. Recognizing that the technology of the industrial revolution had 
created unprecedented opportunities for manufacturers to increase worker 
productivity, Smith developed a principle based on the premise that work should 
be broken down into component tasks. The principle, known as the division of 
labor, achieved its efficiency by reducing even the most complex assignments 
into a series of minute tasks, tasks that are easily understood and performed by 
the workforce. When the tasks are combined the resulting productivity was 
orders of magnitude higher. However, to link these simplistic tasks, complex 
processes had to be developed. The result of centuries of this style of business 
practice is a multi-layered organization comprised of divisions that, as a result of 
their decentralization, may not hold consistent objectives with regards to the 
organization as a whole. Today, overlapping and redundant features within 
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divisional organizations create significant cost and quality inefficiencies. (Ref. 
29, pp. 11-13) In a Harvard Business Review article, "Reengineering Work: 
Don't Automate, Obliterate (1990)" Michael Hammer states, "ltshould come as 
no surprise that our business processes and structures are outmoded and 
obsolete: our work structures and processes have not kept pace with the 
changes in technology, demographics, and business objectives" (Ref. 28, p. 
107). 
Reengineering seeks to collapse traditional organizational boundaries 
and develop streamlined, efficient processes that meet the demands of markets 
and customers. Reengineering proposes a new principle: that the design of 
work must be based not on hierarchical organization and the specialization of 
labor but on work processes and the creation of value for the customer (Ref. 29, 
p. 11 ). 
While the concept of reengineering is not the sole product of any one or 
group of individuals, Michael Hammer's article in the Harvard Business Review, 
"Reengineering Work: Don't Automate, Obliterate (1990)" and a subsequent 
book by Hammer and James Champy, Reengineering the Corporation: A 
Manifesto for Business Revolution (1993), catapulted reengineering to the 
forefront of contemporary management techniques. 
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B. REENGINEERING DEFINITION 
Hammer and Champy define reengineering as: 
... the fundamental rethinking and radical redesign -of business 
processes to achieve dramatic improvements in performance 
(Ref. 30, p. 32). 
In its purest sense, reengineering means starting over. It means wiping 
the slate clean and beginning anew. It means starting from scratch in designing 
core business processes, not spending months analyzing and refining current 
ones. Reengineering does not include tinkering with what already exists or 
making incremental changes that leave basic structures intact. It is not about 
making patchwork fixes and jury-rigging existing systems so that they work 
better. Reengineering means tossing aside old systems and starting over. It 
involves going back to the beginning and inventing a better way of doing work. 
It means pretending that no systems or procedures are in place, and asking, "If 
we were recreating this today, what would it look like?" Hammer writes, "At the 
heart of reengineering is the notion of discontinuous thinking-of recognizing and 
breaking away from the fundamental assumptions that underlie operations" (Ref. 
28, p. 107). 
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In the definition of reengineering by Hammer and Champy, the words 
"radical," "redesign," "processes" and "dramatic" are key to its understanding. 
Each signifies important implications for managers seeking to employ 
Reengineering to improve their organizations: 
• Radical: Comes from the Latin word meaning root. Reengineering is 
not about improving what already exists. Rather it is about throwing it 
away and starting over. Once the traditional processes are understood 
and improved processes are recognized, radical change must be 
implemented to effectively root out the old and usher in the new. 
• Redesign: Reengineering is about the design of how work is done. 
Reengineering is based on the premise that the design of work 
processes is of essential importance. 
• Dramatic: Organizations that adopt Reengineering to effect process 
change should do so with the expectation that quantum leaps in 
performance will be achieved. These dramatic results differ significantly 
from the incremental (e.g. 10%) improvements sought by organizations 
involved in improving old processes. 
• Processes: Work processes are reengineered not departments. This 
simple statement is critical. It makes no sense to claim to reengineer a 
department. Reengineering changes how work is done, across 
traditional units like departments. Processes are the activities that take 
an input and create an output that is of value to the customer. 
Processes are where the improvements are effected in order to 
improve an organization's operation. (Ref. 30, pp. 32-36) 
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C. REENGINEERING PRINCIPLES 
In his landmark 1990 article, Michael Hammer presented the following 
seven principles of reengineering: 
1. Organize around outcomes, not tasks. 
2. Have those that use the output perform the process. 
3. Subsume information-processing work into the real work that 
produces the information. 
4. Treat geographically dispersed resources as though they were 
centralized. 
5. Link parallel activities instead of integrating their results. 
6. Put the decision point where the work is performed. 
7. Capture information at its source. (Ref. 28, pp.106-112) 
As Hammer points out , "reengineering need not be haphazard" (Ref. 28, 
p. 108). While all seven principles may not pertain to every organization, many 
organizations are already applying a number of these principles in their 
reengineering efforts. 
Hammer and Champy's 1993 book provides a deeper analysis of the 
characteristics that typify the reengineering process (Ref. 30, pp. 50-64). 
- Several jobs are combined into one. The most basic and common 
feature of reengineering is the absence of assembly line mentality. Many 
formally distinct jobs or tasks are integrated and compressed, eliminating the 
need for specialists. "Case teams" are constructed to perform the entire process 
and are given total responsibility for its implementation. The payoffs of the 
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integrated process and case teams approach is substantial. Elimination of 
"handoffs" increases process speed while reducing errors and rework. By 
omitting the requirement to develop complex procedures that Were previously 
required to adequately link inter-divisional tasks, administrative overhead is 
reduced. Improved control is another benefit of these integrated processes; 
because they involve fewer people, assigning responsibility for them and 
monitoring performance is easier. 
- Workers make decisions. Corporations that undertake reengineering 
not only compress processes horizontally but also rely on workers within the 
"trenches" to develop alternative measures to become more efficient. Thus, the 
process is also compressed vertically as workers are empowered to make their 
own decisions. Although this transfers control away from executives and 
supervisors of the hierarchial model, more creative, innovative ideas result from 
those who are aware of the process and have "hands on" practical experience. 
The blind reliance on "isolated" executives to make appropriate decisions often 
has led to inferior resource allocation and program implementation choices. 
- The steps in the process are performed in a natural order. 
Reengineered processes are not confined to the traditional straightline 
sequence inherent in linear, sequential processes. Reengineering is focused on 
turning "sequential" processes into "parallel" ones. Sequential processes are 
abundant in bureaucracies: Clerk A finishes her work on a case before turning 
over the paperwork to Clerk B, who finishes his work before turning it over to 
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Auditor C. Parallel processes are what a reengineered bureaucracy is all about: 
Clerk A, Clerk B, and Auditor C work on the case simultaneously. Or even 
better, Clerk A, whose title is now "Case Manager'' handles it from start to finish. 
Either way, the big payoff comes in eliminating the disconnects that are 
inevitable with the "handoffs" associated with a sequential process and reduces 
the amount of time between the early and late steps of a process enabling work 
to completed quicker. 
- Processes have multiple versions. Traditional processes were intended 
to provide mass production for the mass market. Inputs were reduced to the 
most simplistic aspect and standardized so as to achieve uniformity. However, 
this logic is obsolete as it relates to the diversity associated with today's 
consumer environment. Reengineering allows individuals to tailor the process to 
meet unique requirements derived from the situations and circumstances at 
hand. Traditional "one-size-fits..,aJI" processes increase complexity in that they 
must incorporate special procedures and exceptions to handle a wide range of 
situations. In contrast, reengineering maintains a simplistic process because 
each version is only required to handle the case for which it is appropriate. 
- Work is performed where it makes the most sense. Reengineering 
allows the shifting of work across organizational boundaries, contrary to 
traditional methods or business practices. The result is a significant cost 
reduction by reducing and some case eliminating "specialists" as well as the 
reduced time and errors associated with interdepartmental transfers. Work is 
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shifted across organizational boundaries to improve overall process 
performance. 
- Checks and controls are reduced. Reengineered processes use 
controls only to the extent they make economic sense. The controls will, by 
design, tolerate modest or limited abuse, but will more than compensate by 
dramatically lowering the time and costs associated with the control itself. A 
well-designed process, utilizing reengineering techniques, reduces the number 
of jobs, reduces the number of inter-departmental transactions, allows "team" 
members to continually evaluate the process and ultimately reduces the need for 
audits and checks. The goal is not to design a flawless inspection process, but 
to design one that will meet the necessities of a logical audit trail while providing 
a simple, cost-effective method that will get the job done. 
- Hybrid centralized/decentralized operations are prevalent. 
Reengineering allows combination of the advantages of centralization and 
decentralization. Information technology enables individual divisions to act 
autonomously, yet still enjoy the economy of scale that centralization creates. 
Reengineering differs from Total Quality Management (TQM) in that TOM 
programs seek continuous incremental improvement working within the 
framework of existing processes where Reengineering seeks breakthroughs by 
changing existing processes. A breakdown of the major differences between 
Reengineering and TOM is exhibited in Table 1. 
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TQM BPR 
Level of Change Incremental Radical 
Starting Point Existing process Clean slate 
Frequency of Change Continuous One-time 
Time Required Short Long 
Participation Bottom-up Top-down 
Typical Scope Narrow, within functions Broad, cross-functional 
Risk Moderate High 
Primary Enabler Statistical control Information Technology 
Type of Change Cultural Cultural/Structural 
Table 1. TQM vs. BPR [After Ref. 31] 
D. IMPLEMENTING REENGINEERING 
Reengineering is a top-down process. Participation by senior executives 
is required to initiate and implement a successful reengineering effort. Senior 
managers possess the broad perspective to see the process as a whole and to 
recognize its poor overall design as the source of their problems. Additionally, 
business processes cross organizational boundaries, so no mid-level manager 
will have sufficient authority to transform a process. Radical change proposed 
by reengineering threatens the status quo and requires senior management 
leadership to focus on improving process orientation without regards to 
individual turf or ownership "rice bowls." Hammer and Champy (1993) state: 
Reengineering, in contrast (to TQM), is an intensive, 
top-down vision-driven effort that requires nonstop 
senior management participation and support. 
(Ref. 30, p. 219) 
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As a result of its own reengineering program, AT&T identified four steps 
to implementing a successful program (Ref. 32, pp. 1-73). The first step is to 
evaluate the benefits, costs and risks. The primary activity for this step is to 
evaluate the feasibility of a reengineering project based on expected benefits, 
risks, and the environment. The deliverables for this step are the decision to 
begin, the charter for the reengineering team, and a strategy for change 
management. 
The second step in reengineering is to recommend a concept for a 
redesigned process. The primary activity for this step is to develop and evaluate 
concepts for a new process design based on customer requirements, 
benchmarking and innovative ideas. The deliverables for this step are 
innovative ideas, high-level flowcharts, estimated requirements, preliminary 
feasibility analysis, and the decision to continue. 
The third step is to design the process. The primary activity for this step 
is to develop and evaluate the detailed design. The deliverables for this step 
are detailed flowcharts, process measures, prediction models, final feasibility 
analysis, and the decision to implement the redesigned process. 
The fourth step is to implement the process. The primary activity for this 
step is to develop the final implementation plan and select the cutover strategy. 
The deliverables for this step are the implementation plan, plan for 
organizational redesign, implementation of change management plan and a 
redesigned process that is continuously managed. 
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Implementation of reengineering should not be seen as a quick fix. It is a 
hard, gut-wrenching, time-consuming process. It is unprecedented in its attempt 
to completely reinvent the basic aspects of organizations. There are many 
reasons for failure but most can be attributed to individuals who do not approach 
reengineering by applying its basic principles and do not understand the basic 
processes of their own organization. Hammer and Stanton (1995) list the top ten 
ways to fail at reengineering (Ref. 29, pp. 14-33): 
1. Don't reengineer but say that you are. 
2. Don't focus on processes. 
3. Spend a lot of time analyzing the current situation. 
4. Proceed without strong executive leadership. 
5. Be timid in redesign. 
6. Go directly from conceptual design to implementation. 
7. Reengineer slowly. 
8. Place some aspects of the business off-limits. 
9. Adopt a conventional implementation style. 
10. Ignore the concerns of your people. 
E. REENGINEERING GOVERNMENT 
The pressures for reengineering are just as intense in the public sector 
where shrinking budgets and public pressure for reform necessitate a change in 
the "business as usual" approach. One unique challenge to reengineering in the 
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public sector is the difficulty of measuring performance. Private sector 
organizations can use profit as a yardstick of success, and profit is linked to 
costs, or by increasing quality and service, therefore driving up' revenues. The 
bottom line represents a simple way of telling whether the business is improving 
or not. Most public sector institutions, however, have only a cost line {even then 
good cost data is not always available), which makes it hard to assess tradeoffs 
between improving services and reducing costs. 
A second difficulty is that breaking down departmental barriers within a 
corporation is much easier than breaking them down between or within 
government agencies. 
Reengineering in the government, as in the private sector, is painful and 
risky. Preparation is required to improve the chances of successful 
implementation. Preparation includes: 
• Shaping a vision and infrastructure to support it. 
• Educating managers on the opportunities and process of reengineering. 
• Finding creative sources of funding. 
• Benchmarking performance and making the measures visible. 
- Shaping a vision and infrastructure to support it. Reengineering requires 
a leap from the well-understood status quo. Proposals to reengineer will not 
gain adequate support unless people can share a motivating vision of success. 
The vision should emphasize purposes, behavior, performance criteria, decision 
rules, and standards that serve the public rather than the organization (Ref. 33, 
p. 156). 
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- Educating managers on the opportunities and process of reengineering. 
Reengineering requires cooperation between information technology managers, 
program managers, and senior leadership. Educating these managers and 
building cooperative relationships among them is an essential part of building 
the infrastructure for successful reengineering. 
- Finding creative sources of funding. Funding projects in reengineering 
can be a large issues especially for the government. Discretionary funds are 
under tremendous budget pressure. Innovative sources must be established to 
fund the reengineering process. Examples of potential methods for saving 
money include: sharing savings among stakeholders involved in reengineering 
efforts (i.e. department budgets, civilian workers), or, developing public/private 
ventures that could be funded in part by private firms. 
- Benchmarking performance and making the measures visible. In past 
government practices little has been done to measure service performance. It is 
time to measure government performance against world-class performers where 
applicable. Measures such as customer service, overhead costs, and worker 
ratios can be evaluated against industry standards. (Ref. 34, pp. 51-53) 
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In his book The Reengineering Revolution: A Handbook (1995) Hammer 
refers to organizations, including the federal government, that are not primarily 
motivated by the "bottomline" as mission-driven organizations· (Ref. 29, pp. 
27 4-290). He provides four precepts for reengineering mission-driven 
organizations: 
• Carefully identify and understand customers. 
• Clearly specify performance measures. 
• Be sensitive to the concerns of idealists in the organization. 
• Deflect those who use the mission as a smokescreen for resistance. 
Few public sector reengineering projects have been around long enough 
to have much of a track record. The Clinton administration's National 
Performance Review (NPR) and U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) are 
two examples of notable government reengineering efforts. The National 
Performance Review is an attempt by the White House under the direct 
supervision of Vice President Gore to utilize reengineering principles to cut 
government bureaucracy and waste and improve performance standards (Ref. 
35, p. 19). The U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) has committed to 
reengineering to improve the command's business practices to create the most 
efficient organization possible. The goal is to transform itself from an "industrial 
age fighting force into one firmly founded on digitized information age 
technology, which creates faster, more effective battlefield communications." 
(Ref. 36, pp. 31-34) 
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DOD published guidance on Business Process Reengineering is 
contained primarily in three documents: DOD 8020.1-M, Interim Management 
Guidance on Functional Process Improvement; Corporate Information 
Management: Process Improvement for DOD Managers; and, Framework For 
Managing Process Improvement: A Guide to the Methodology (Refs. 37; 38; 39). 
The primary purpose of these documents is to apply the theoretical concepts of 
reengineering into a practical model that can be applied to organizational 
processes within the DOD. 
F. SUMMARY 
This chapter introduced Reengineering as a management approach to the 
fundamental redesign of business processes. Although similarities exist 
between reengineering and other initiatives, the significant difference is that 
reengineering seeks to radically change work processes to achieve large 
improvements rather than implementing incremental changes to existing 
processes to achieve marginal improvements. 
While governments have lagged behind the private sector in embracing 
reengineering, the opportunities to successfully achieve significant performance 
gains by applying reengineering precepts do exist. Wherever there are work 





IV. REENGINEERING THE NAVY POM AND PPBS PROCESSES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Organizational structure and resource allocation processes within DOD 
have been under constant scrutiny and revision since the end of World War II. 
The National Security Act of 1947 was the product of Congressional compromise 
that attempted to accommodate two fundamentally incompatible approaches to 
how the DOD should be organized and how the nation's defense policies should 
best be formulated and implemented: it sought to structure a defense 
organization that would be unified, yet retain Service autonomy. The 1947 Act 
established a Secretary of Defense to act as "the principal assistant to the 
President in all matters relating to national security" while at the same time 
providing that "nothing herein shall prevent the Secretary of the Army, Secretary 
of the Navy, or Secretary of the Air Force from presenting to the President ... 
any report or recommendation relating to his department which he may deem 
necessary'' (Ref. 40). 
The 1948 Key West Agreement was the product of a meeting convened 
by the first Secretary of Defense, James Forrestal, to work out disagreements 
among the Services sparked by the National Security Act of 1947. The 
agreement sought to limit interservice competition by confirming the traditional 
functional boundaries of the military departments (Ref. 41, p. 47). Formal 
allocation of roles and functions was intended to prevent unnecessary 
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duplication. However, instead of promoting jointness, the military departments 
and services sought to preserve as much of their independence as possible. 
In 1949 an amendment to the National Security Act of 1947 strengthened 
the authority of SECDEF and took away the right of the Services to submit their 
budgets directly to the President. The amendment also established a Chairman 
for the JCS (Ref. 42). 
The Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 granted SECDEF broad 
statutory authority that has continued to date, including the authority to transfer, 
consolidate and abolish the functions and roles of the military services. The 
1958 Act gave the Defense Secretary the statutory authority to exert centralized 
control over the Services through the budgetary process. Further, the 1958 Act 
gave the Secretary the power to establish unified and specified commands, and 
it put the operational control of those commands in the hands of the Defense 
Secretary (Ref. 43). In 1962, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara utilized 
this broad power vested in the DOD civilian leadership to implement a 
technically-oriented resource management system based on system analysis: 
PPBS. For McNamara, the way to coordinate strategy was to decentralize 
much of the execution of the budget while centralizing the decision-making 
process for defense policy, i.e., planning and programming. 
The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 
1986 was designed to correct the perceived weaknesses in the defense 
organizational structure established in 1947 by further centralizing defense 
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decision-making within the JCS. One of its major provisions was to require 
CJCS to review Service budget proposals and advise SECDEF as to their 
impact on the unified and specified commands (Ref. 1 0). 
These various initiatives to define the defense organization and resource 
allocation processes clearly demonstrate what has plagued and frustrated 
defense reformers since the end of WWII: (1) how best to structure the American 
defense organization to meet the goals of developing and implementing long-
range, coordinated plans and policies; and; (2) how to establish the proper link 
between national security policy and the roles and missions of the military 
services. 
The FY 94 Defense Authorization Act created the Commission on Roles 
and Missions of the Armed Forces to "review ... the appropriateness ... of 
current allocations of roles, missions, and functions among the Armed Forces; 
evaluate and report on alternative allocations; and make recommendations for 
changes in the current definition and distribution of those roles, missions and 
functions" (Ref. 44). The Commission breaks from the traditional approach to 
roles and missions, i.e., attempting to allocate them among the Services in 
context of the Key West Agreement, and champions the call for greater 
emphasis on unified military operations while affirming the necessity of "broad" 
Service competition (Ref. 45, p. ES-3). 
Recognition of the broader structural and historical problems faced by 
DOD is important when proposing changes to any part of it. PPBS is no 
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exception. Changes in the method DOD employs for resource allocation will 
reverberate throughout its organizational structure. DOD budget and program 
decisions are key to the architecture of the Defense Department because those 
decisions often result in the de facto allocation of roles, missions and functions. 
(Ref. 45, p. ES-7) As a seasoned NAVCOMPT analyst noted, "Budget is policy." 
This chapter will analyze three possible frameworks within which DOD 
resource allocation and, in particular, Navy POM and PPBS processes, may be 
reengineered to achieve greater efficiency and effectiveness. Although each 
method varies in degree of change from incremental to more radical, each offers 
systemic changes to the current process. Their effect on the architecture of the 
Defense Department is outlined here. 
B. STRATEGY -TO-TASKS 
1. Description 
The following description is based on a RAND study by Leslie Lewis and 
C. Robert Roll, Strategy-to-Tasks: A Methodology for Resource Allocation and 
Management (1993). The strategy-to-tasks framework is intended to make 
PPBS more rational and credible by linking high-level strategic goals to tasks 
performed by the various participants in PPBS. The linkages, defined by the 
methodology, are intended to help the participants in the PPBS process to 
interact more effectively. (Ref. 46, p. 1) 
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Strategy-to-tasks provides decision-makers with an end-to-end concept of 
operations. It links resource decisions to specific military tasks that require 
resources which, in tum, are linked downward hierarchically from higher-level 
operational and national security strategies to supporting programs and tasks. 
Likewise, resource decisions can be linked upward from tasks up through 











Figure 22 Strategy-to-Tasks Hierarchy of Linkages 
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Note: The cmcept of 
linkage is represented by 




[After Ref. 46] 
Using the national military strategy, developed from the national security 
strategy, specific military objectives may be clearly identified. The National 
Military Strategy of 1995 states the national military objectives as: (1) promote 
stability, (2) to thwart aggression. Within these military objectives a definition is 
provided on how the U.S. national security strategy will be supported militarily 
and how the U.S. will respond to threats to its national security. Military 
objectives should fold into the strategic concepts in the National Military Strategy 
- overseas presence and power projection - and its components - peacetime 
engagement, deterrence and conflict prevention, and fighting and winning wars. 
The next consideration is operational objectives. Operational objectives 
define various military strategies. They describe how forces are to be used to 
support national military objectives. They represent the CINC's vision and 
strategic perspective on how the various assets support national military 
objectives and national security objectives. Operational objectives are the link 
between higher-level national security and military objectives and mission-
specific operations, and the resources that support those operations. 
Operational tasks define the next level of the hierarchy. Tasks are 
formulated by the CINCs. They are specific actions that must be performed to 
accomplish an operational objective. Each task is defined by an operational 
concept. An operational concept weaves together the various systems, 
organizations, and tactics needed to accomplish a particular task. Operational 
tasks support operational objectives. 
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Employment tasks are actions that must be performed in support of 
operational tasks. An individual employment task may contribute to more than 
one operational task, and in turn, an operational task may support more than 
one operational objective. Force elements are groups of resources (personnel, 
training and equipment) needed to perform an employment task. Because many 
different types of force elements can be used to support a task, decision makers 
must choose the resource combinations that are most cost effective in 
accomplishing a task. 
Using the strategy-to-tasks framework, DOD could evaluate its force 
structure and the modernization programs of the Services by operational 
objective and task. DOD leadership would decide system funding based on its 
necessity in providing capabilities to multiple mission areas, or to those that are 
unique but necessary to support a particular mission. Strategy-to-Tasks works 
within the current PPBS process and is supportive of each of its phases. 
The objective of Strategy-to-Tasks is to provide a basis for evaluating 
alternative programs that potentially could meet warfighting needs and then to 
establish and justify resource priorities within the context of the national security 
strategy. 
2. Application to Navy POM and PPBS Processes 
The design of current Navy POM and PPBS processes closely resembles 
the strategy-to-tasks methodology. The Joint Mission Area/Support Area 
(JMA/SA) assessments completed at the outset of the Programming phase are 
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aimed at ensuring naval forces match national security requirements and 
contribute to joint force capabilities. The subsequent Investment Balance 
Review (IBR) attempts to forge the assessment results into a c6nsensus 
investment strategy matching fiscal resources with required capabilities. This 
process strives to ensure that Navy programs address warfighting requirements, 
are properly funded, and are balanced across all warfare and support areas. 
However, several systemic problems within the Navy PPBS process 
inhibit the linkage between strategy and tasks. First, failure to encourage "out-
of-the-box'' thinking in the JMA/SA assessment process tends to produce a 
"scaled-down" version of today's Navy rather than the smaller, more flexible 
force envisioned in the Navy white paper Forward ... From the Sea (Ref.17, p. 
55). Instead of cutting across the concerns of traditional platform and warfare 
areas, the JMA/SA assessments reflect the parochial interests of the resource 
sponsors who supervise them (Ref. 16, p. 17). 
Second, the current IBR structure does not produce clear guidance for 
upcoming POM development. Neither SECNAV's DON Programming Guidance 
or N80's Preliminary Programming Guidance fully incorporates the outcome of 
the IBR. National security issues and joint planning requirements covered in 
excruciating detail during the JMA/SAs are not given complete consideration by 
Programmers. Without clear guidance at the beginning of POM development, 
traditional OPNAV power players (i.e., Resource Sponsors) at present have the 
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opportunity to exert their parochial biases on POM development, potentially at 
the expense of strategic programs (Ref. 16, pp. 39-41 ). 
Third, the JMA/SA assessments fail to develop an adequate 
understanding of what resources the Army or Air Force could apply to a given 
mission area so that Navy needs and capabilities in the same mission area 
might be compared and traded off with the contributions of other services (Ref. 
25, pp. 33-38). An example is the assessment of Navy strike capabilities 
compared to Air Force strike capabilities. Failure to identify redundant naval 
capabilities or resources that could be reduced with minimal degradation to the 
nation's security and then to apply savings to other naval programs can produce 
cost-inefficient results during the OSD "end game" review. Better 
organizational incentives are needed to allow military Department Secretaries to 
retain savings generated from identifying duplicative or unnecessary capabilities 
in their future "top line," and to encourage innovative thinking to the benefit of 
the entire Department of Defense. 
C. MISSION-BASED RESOURCE ALLOCATION 
1. Description 
The following description is based in part on the work of L. R. Jones and 
G.C. Bixler in their book, Mission Financing to Realign National Defense (1992). 
Contemporary management philosophy asserts that the effectiveness of 
large, complex organizations improves when authority and responsibility are 
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delegated down into the organization. Within the present DOD system, 
influence over resource allocation is overwhelmingly with Congress, OSD and 
military services and not with the operational commands. Under a missron-
based methodology for resource allocation, the responsibility for operations and 
procurement, resources definition and budget execution would be placed at the 
command level, where military commanders (i.e., CINCs) could utilize their 
expertise to make resource allocation and mission tradeoffs. Corporate 
experience shows the value of putting responsibility and authority into the hands 
of those responsible for the "mission." Decisions are made where the work is 
completed. The benefits of compressing the decision-making process vertically, 
i.e., down to the individuals closest to the "mission," include better efficiency, 
fewer mistakes and rework, lower overhead and greater empowerment of the 
workers (Ref. 30, p. 53). 
The preeminence of the Unified CINCs in implementing the national 
military strategy to support the national security strategy is now well entrenched 
in U.S. defense guidance, if not fully in the collective psyche of the uniformed 
services. The Commission on Roles and Missions reported, "We reaffirm the 
role of the CINCs that has evolved in law and in practice: CINCs are responsible 
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for fighting America's wars and employing military forces in pursuit of national 
security objectives." They go on to say, 
The central message ... is in the 21st century, every· DOD 
element must focus on supporting the operations of the 
Unified Commanders in Chief (CINCs). Everything DOD does 
-from furnishing health care to developing new weapons--should 
support that effort (Ref. 45, p. ES-1 ). 
These statements reflect the fact that combatant commands should be 
understood to be the principal instruments for execution of U.S. defense policy. 
In a mission-based resource allocation structure, most of the Defense 
Department budget would be allocated directly to the unified and specified 
commands, or alternatively to the individual Service CINCs. The basic 
assumption supporting this approach is that military commanders know best 
what types of operations, hardware, facilities and equipment are needed to deter 
threat and to engage in war when required. Further, it is assumed that they are 
better able to take advantage of efficiencies related to the utilization of the 
private sector, especially in support areas, than similar initiatives controlled and 
managed by the Pentagon and Congress. The four services would compete to 
provide forces, weapons and supplies to the Unified commands. Military 
Departments would maintain their Title X prerogatives to organize, train and 
equip their combat and supporting forces but in conformance with CINC 
requirements. 
The mission approach criticizes the present system for inhibiting 
innovation and efficiency primarily because it operates under a centralized, 
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command-control framework rather than according to market-based principles 
that would result in greater efficiency (Ref. 47, p. 215). Under mission-based 
methodology, competition among the services would provide that market-base. 
No service could purposely "over-price" its capabilities because the overlapping 
abilities of the other services would provide a substitutable force. The 
architecture of the force, its configuration and application would become the 
province of force commanders (the CINCs), rather than the "supplying" 
department or agency. 
The role of OSD as well as the service secretaries would be similar to 
what it is now, that is, to communicate decisions on policy and commitments 
from Congress, the President, SECDEF and JCS to the military commanders 
and to exercise centralized budget rationing authority. Commitments and 
national security objectives still would be determined by Congress and the 
President, but decisions on operating and support spending to execute the 
national military strategy would be made at the command level with far more 
authority delegated to military commanders than is the case presently. The 
focus of the planning process would be on mission outputs. The financial role of 
policy makers would be to specify, in general, how much money should be spent 
attempting to achieve major national security goals by command and mission 
area. In this way, resource priorities by mission and mission area or 
geographical region would have to be defined more clearly. Further, the costs to 
support discrete missions by region or area would be more clearly identified. 
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Such information would aid benefit/cost and benefit/risk analysis for alternative 
uses of resources. Priorities could be linked more clearly to resource decisions. 
Adoption of mission-based budgeting would eliminate the necessity for 
centralized preparation of the POM in the programming component in PPBS. 
While the basic PPBS process would be retained, programming would be a 
function performed by the CINCs as would budget formulation. Planning, 
programming and budgeting for the DOD could be analyzed according to 
mission areas, e.g., Atlantic forces, Pacific forces, strategic forces, and 
contingency forces. The full DOD budget could be appropriated in a mission 
format by adding one more mission component (management support forces) to 
cover the costs of operating the Pentagon and other Pentagon-based 
management support activities (Ref. 47, p. 213). Under the mission-based 
approach, budgets would be proposed by the CINCs, reviewed according to 
criteria established by OSD and the military departments, proposed to and then 
appropriated by Congress. The transfer of funds to command budgets for 
execution would be straight-forward following the resource decisions negotiated 
between Congress and the President. In this regard mission budgeting is 
essentially the same as the existing process. However, by placing greater 
authority with the war fighting CINCs the presumption is that such a delegation 
could lead to less micromanagement of the Defense Department and defense 
budget by Congress. Whether this would result is a political question rather 
than a management issue. 
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The basic tenets of the mission-based resource allocation methodology 
have long history of support by Pentagon reformers: Secretary of Defense 
Weinberger (1982), Packard Commission (1986), Goldwater-Nichols (1986), 
U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee/House Armed Services Committee 
(1990), CJCS Powell's Base Force (1991) and the Commission on Roles and 
Missions (1995). These initiatives have recognized that implementation of a 
mission-based methodology would better align existing DOD management and 
mission control structures, eliminate unnecessary procedural complexity, cut the 
size of the decision system to what is needed to operate more efficiently, and to 
better utilize the expertise of the private sector. The Commission on Roles and 
Missions asserted, "The CINCs must have greater influence over the processes 
and priorities used to acquire the weapons, equipment, and forces they need to 
accomplish their warfighting and other missions ... " (Ref. 45, p. 2-1 ). 
Mission-based budgeting would provide this influence but would require 
substantial delegation of authority. In turn, it would provide more accountability 
by relating mission capability by area or region more directly to the policy 
priorities established by elected officials. Mission-based budgeting would 
assess and allocate resources on the basis of threat, commitments, desired 
outcomes, and national security priorities. It would emphasize the importance of 
policy to guide budgets rather than having budgets drive policy. 
Responsibility for resource decision-making, allocation, and management 
described in the mission-based methodology above can ultimately be given to 
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Unified commanders or to the military service commands. However, Jones and 
Bixler conclude that it would be more effective to place the programming and 
budgeting responsibilities with the service mission area commahds, that is, 
Commander in Chief U.S. Army Europe; Commander in Chief U.S. Air Forces 
Pacific, Commander in Chief U.S. Atlantic Fleet; etc. These regional service 
commanders are the best qualified because they are specialists in the warfare 
mission areas in which their services operate. Their specialized experience and 
close proximity to the fighting forces improve their ability to make optimum 
resource decisions. 
2. Application to Navy POM and PPBS Processes 
Mission-based budgeting would radically change current Navy POM and 
PPBS processes. The current process requires that a POM and budget be 
produced by different organizations, resulting in a somewhat disjointed decision-
making apparatus. Although the CINCs, component commanders and claimants 
provide input for the POM they do not directly engage in its development. CINC 
input is provided in issues submitted as CINC Maritime concerns prior to 
JMA/SA assessments and CINC IPLs submitted prior to the IBR. Means for 
Component Commanders to influence POM development is through Component 
Issue Papers (CIPs) where their program and budget requirements, prioritized 
by Unified CINC IPLs, must be addressed by Resource Sponsors in SPPDs. 
Claimants submit their major programmatic concerns in the form of issue papers 
to the OPNAV staff. Resource Sponsors consider these concerns as they 
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develop Sponsor Program Proposals. While this process serves to enter 
CINC/Component Commander requirements into POM deliberations it does not 
ensure their eventual funding. OPNAV program managers are'judged on the 
basis of how successful they are in getting parochial service requirements 
funded, built and operational, not on their skill in introducing a joint perspective 
to the process in which the services make decisions about what they need (Ref. 
48, p. 1 0). The centralized nature of POM development in the current process 
limits CINC/Component Commander direct influence on programmatic choices. 
While the field activities and claimants do participate directly in budget 
development, they have little flexibility to address additional program 
requirements identified by the CINCs/Component Commanders. Budget 
estimates and exhibits are required to reflect programs contained in the POM 
(Ref. 19, p. 1-35). Executability problems in the POM restrict the ability of 
claimants to match resource dollars with resource requirements. This forces 
continual rework by budget personnel to ensure funds are not wasted or lost. 
Archaic appropriation rules established by a micro-managing Congress also 
make it difficult for claimants to move resources when necessary to manage 
more efficiently. 
Mission-based budgeting would eliminate separate POM and budgeting 
responsibilities, combining them under the responsibility of the CINCs. It is 
important to note that the basic tasks of programming would be retained and still 
performed, but in a much less complicated process and folded into budgeting. 
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This may viewed as long-range budgeting similar to practices employed in the 
private sector. CINCs/Component Commanders/Claimants could more 
effectively allocate resources to achieve program objectives beeause they would 
be more focused on execution. Resource Sponsors could still play an oversight 
role to ensure claimant allocations meet sponsor priorities. However, the 
necessity for employing a large, centralized Navy headquarters staff as currently 
exists to do the POM would be gone. The Investment Balance Review could 
pass program/budget controls directly to claimants vice Resource Sponsors. 
CINCs/Component Commanders/Claimants would have the lead in program 
formulation and would continue to be responsible for budget formulation. The 
entire process would not be redundant and disjointed as is the case presently. 
Navy headquarters would still retain control over some parts of the budget, 
particularly major acquisition and force structure decisions. Figure (23) 
illustrates one approach to program development under the mission-based 
process. 
Claimants would submit budgets with elements of the POM, as it is 
presently prepared, embedded in them. SECNAV would hold an integrated 
POM/budget review. At that time claimants could explain Service program 
objectives that are deemed "unaffordable". The major benefit of this type of 
system is in having claimants gain greater control over their resources. Since 
the claimants are more focused on execution, they can allocate resources to 











Figure 23 Mission-Based Program Development 
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increased visibility, more refined program information, programs would have 
budget quality detail, and there would be far less need for "endgame" balancing. 
It would allow the CNO and SECNAV to focus on the big picture in a single 
format rather than at multiple points in the resource decision process. It would 
also highlight major resource tradeoffs for decision makers. 
Mission budgeting could be implemented in other ways to reengineer 
Navy PPBS. The approach outlined here is illustrative of the types of thinking 
required to apply reengineering to make Navy resource decision-making both 
more efficient and effective. 
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D. GENERAL STAFF COMMAND 
1. Description 
Post WWII, Congress considered two alternatives for st[ategic planning 
and policy: (1) a corporate JCS made up of Service Chiefs and a chairman with 
a joint staff serving as a "reporting and analysis entity" to ensure the President 
receives a diversity of views, (2) a single, authoritarian chief of staff supported 
by a general staff. The Army favored military unification to promote the 
centralization of decision-making power; the Navy wanted a decentralized 
decision-making structure that retained Service autonomy and the coordination 
of policy through compromise (Ref. 49, p. 7). It was not without a hostile and 
bitter fight that the National Security Act of 1947 finally produced the JCS 
structure. 
Today, perhaps the most radical approach for creating a more efficient 
resource allocation decision process within DOD would be establishment of a 
General Staff Command composed of a specially selected and trained cadre of 
career military officers. Such a group of officers specially trained in joint 
warfare and organized under a independent promotion system, would in theory 
be able, "to rise above Service interests," set unbiased military goals and 
priorities, and tailor the defense budget to achieve the most efficient allocation of 
funds. It may be argued that a General Staff would be able to provide fast, or 
more flexible decisions unencumbered by the parochial, self-serving interests of 
the Services. This is the ultimate form of "jointness." 
89 
Prior to passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the JCS was required to 
provide military advice based on a consensus among the members. Because 
the members of JCS also represented a particular Service, i.e:, the dual-hatted 
role of the Service Chiefs, they usually expressed their opinion in terms of what 
was best for their Service. The pressure was to build agreement and the result 
was a carefully drafted paper that accommodated everyone (Ref. 50, pp. 65-66). 
Goldwater-Nichols significantly increased the powers of the Chairman, 
Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Chairman is now the principal military advisor to the 
National Command Authority (NCA). He no longer must reach a consensus 
among the Joint Chiefs before recommending options. He is also the transmitter 
of NCA decisions to the unified and specified combatant commanders. The Joint 
Staff now works directly for the Chairman. The individual services may review 
and provide comment on joint matters, but no longer must approve a particular 
position prior to its recommendation. (Ref. 1 0) 
Goldwater-Nichols and previous legislation specifically protect against 
JCS operation as a General Staff: "The Joint Staff shall not operate or be 
organized as an Armed Forces General Staff and shall have no executive 
authority." (Refs. 10, 42, 43). However, implementation has taken the direction 
of "jointness" above all else. In fact, the increased role of JCS in resource 
issues has moved it from the primary task of strategic planning to competition in 
the budget battles, in effect, marrying requirements determination with resource 
allocation within the JCS. 
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While full implementation of a General Staff structure has not occurred, 
e.g., the Chairman must still present the advice or opinions of individual JCS 
members when those opinions differ from his and Service Chiefs still maintain 
Title X authority, the move has been unmistakenably toward a de facto General 
Staff. This move is in recognition of the basic efficiencies of a General Staff: 
• A cadre of professional officers trained and serving exclusively in the 
joint arena. 
• Better, quicker decisions/advice to SECDEF and the President not 
rooted in Service parochialism. 
• An objective view of CINC requirements from a purely Joint perspective. 
• Better determination of the requirements of multi-service warfighting 
and coordination of the design specifications of those requirements, 
thereby conserving scarce fiscal resources (Ref. 51, p. 49). 
2. Application to Navy POM and PPBS Processes 
Instituting a General Staff structure within the DOD would radically 
redesign the Navy POM and PPBS process. The exact process of implementing 
this type of structure is beyond the scope of this thesis but several major 
ramifications are evident. 
Planning, already under the purview of the Joint staff, would take on an 
even greater role. Guidance emanating from JCS would be directive in nature, 
clearly identifying the roles, missions and capabilities that the Navy {and other 
Services) would perform. The Navy would concentrate on its "core 
competencies" [(carrier-based air and amphibious power projection, sea-based 
air and missile defense, and anti-submarine warfare) (Ref. 45, p. 2-20)]. Output 
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from the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) would be prescriptive rather 
than descriptive of programs and budgets formulated by the Navy. The Joint 
Warfare Capabilities Assessment (JWCA) teams would make program decisions 
predicated on roles and functions of the Services in all joint areas: strike, ground 
maneuver, air superiority, overseas presence, etc. 
The Navy would still retain the flexibility to determine the means to meet 
the directives of the General Staff. However, the end to incessant battling over 
roles and missions would simplify the process immensely. Most of the events in 
the program planning phase of the Navy POM could be eliminated. The JMAISA 
assessments would be repetitious of the JWCA. Answers to questions of the 
Navy's future "size, structure and character'' typically worked out in the JMAISA 
assessments would be hashed out in a joint format where each Service's 
capabilities could be compared and the most prudent investments determined. 
Navy strategies to meet the dictates coming from the Joint Staff could be 
discussed in a limited JMAISA that focused more on implementing 
recommendations than formulating them. Navy POM development would ensure 
that programs properly support Component Commander and Claimant 
requirements for executing Unified CINC missions. 
The organizational trend of DOD since passage of the Goldwater-Nichols 
Act has been increasingly toward greater jointness. Whether this trend 
ultimately will lead to a General Staff Command structure is open to question 
and debate. Many fear that evolution to a General Staff Command would lead 
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logically to the merger of the three branches of the military into a single Service. 






Problems with the current PPBS process analyzed in this thesis may be 
summarized as follows: 
• Process dominates substance. The process is so arduous that it 
consumes enormous scarce resources to execute, leaving little time for 
the participants to be thoughtful or creative. 
• The strategy and planning aspects are weak and need to reflect 
"jointness" and greater CINC participation. 
• The system was created pre-Goldwater-Nichols Act passage and fails 
to reflect the dramatic shift in responsibilities from the Departments to 
the JCS and CINCs, particularly in the requirements area. 
• Few major decisions are made in the POM cycle. Rather, they are 
made in the budget cycle or via other processes such as the JROC, or 
in Congress. 
• Considerable effort is expended thrashing out details of programs six 
years in the future while the uncertainties faced make major changes in 
six year plans almost certain. This inhibits flexibility and the ability to 
refocus programs as change occurs, and wastes a great deal of staff 
time and effort. (Ref. 52, p. 1) 
Throughout the Departments of Defense and Navy there is a widespread 
belief that the PPBS process is broken beyond marginal fixes. The research 
completed for this thesis reinforces such skepticism. Changes that only a few 
years ago were considered radical are now being considered in the mainstream. 
A fundamental overhaul of the existing process appears to be necessary to bring 
defense resource allocation in line with the demands of the 21st Century. Why 
now? The high probability of even more severe budget constraints will require 
95 
the ability to operate effectively with less funding. Lessons learned from 
successful business initiatives appear to present the opportunity for substantial 
resource savings. Full implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols Act will 
continue the trend towards joint planning, budgeting and operations. The 
traditional "one-third split" and "who gets to do what" approach to defining roles 
and missions is being replaced by a "who needs what" approach to allocation 
decisions affecting joint military capabilities. A key issue is whether the CINCs 
have the set of capabilities they need to fulfill their missions. (Ref. 45, p. 1-4) 
This thesis presented three frameworks for reengineering the Navy POM 
and PPBS processes: Strategy-to-Tasks, Mission-Based Resource Allocation, 
and the General Staff Command. 
The Strategy-to-Tasks methodology provides only incremental 
improvements to the existing processes. It does not provide the radical process 
reengineering that is required. It still relies on the same centralized, 
bureaucratic process and traditional power players as the existing PPBS. While 
the Strategy-to-Tasks links provide a clearer, more rational process in defining 
requirements, it does not facilitate innovative ways to redefine them. 
A mission-oriented approach to resource allocation would provide a 
fundamental change to the current PPBS process. A decentralized, mission-
based process would improve the efficiency and effectiveness of DOD resource 
allocation by aligning resource allocation with mission purpose within the 
operating units, i.e., CINCs or Component Commanders. The operating units 
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are the "users" of the military capabilities while the Services compete to provide 
the required capabilities. Corporate experience shows the value of placing 
primary responsibility for resource allocation in the hands of those responsible 
for the "mission." It is within this structure that the efficiency and effectiveness 
of a joint fighting force is coupled with the innovation and creativity that 
interservice competition provides. 
The apprehension of Congress and the American people with regard to a 
General Staff patterned after the Prussian-German model will likely prevent the 
complete unification of the U.S. Armed Services. The current system of Service 
autonomy reflects the American political system of checks and balances and the 
American economic system of competition. The development of options and 
alternatives for dealing with the wide array of threats facing the U.S. in a 
complex world depends upon the open airing of disagreements among the 
Services. The efficiency of a General Staff structure is rooted in its ability to 
suppress alternatives within its own organization. It insulates SECDEF and his 
staff from competing military points of view. The development of a variety of 
options, whether in resource allocation or military operations, requires the 
consideration of diverse and often conflicting viewpoints that arise from the 
protection of self-interests. It is the competition between the Services that 
provides the major impetus for innovation and creativity. 
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B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
It is the recommendation of this author that a mission-based system of 
resource allocation be further studied and debated with strong consideration 
toward implementation to reengineer PPBS. Implementation would require 
reengineering of the Navy POM and PPBS processes to provide required 
capabilities in response to CINC/Component Commander requirements. 
Characteristics of the new mission-based system would include the 
following: 
• Planning would be done at the JCS and OSD level. Programming and 
budgeting would be combined and performed largely, but not 
completely, at CINC/Component Commander level. 
• Most of the defense budget would be allocated to CINCs/Component 
Commanders and the Services would compete to provide forces, 
weapons and supplies to the Unified Commands. 
• PPBS would become more flexible to respond to changes in threat, 
technology or funding. It could enable roles, missions, functions and 
programs to respond to changes in the threat and political 
environments. 
• PPBS would focus far more on mission outputs, outcomes and results 
rather than resource inputs. 
In sum, the mission-based process would do four things which appear to 
be necessary. First, it would foster debate and consensus among major players 
on major issues at the beginning of the program development process, thus 
making programming and budgeting together less people and time consumptive, 
and far less complex and centralized than in the Pentagon. Second, it would 
allow participation of all the players, with a stronger role for CJNCs, JCS and 
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military Service commanders. Third, it would put the decisions for matching more 
resources, requirements and capabilities where it belongs, with the operational 
users. Finally, it would streamline the decision process and make it more 
adaptive to change than the current program budgeting system. 
C. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
This thesis provided a comprehensive description of the current PPBS 
process within the Department of the Navy. It also analyzed how the process 
could be reengineered utilizing three alternative methodological frameworks and 
recommended the mission-based approach. 
Further research is necessary to provide alternative "blueprint designs" 
for implementation of the mission-based methodology in the Department of the 
Navy and DOD. The effects of implementation might not be limited to the 
organizational structure of DOD but could have broad implications for how 
Congress determines policy and budgets for national defense, and also for 
defense industry practices and DOD acquisition. 
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APPENDIX A. GENERAL PPBS SCHEDULE 
Date Event PPBS Phase 
November Draft Defense Guidance Issued Planning 
July-December OPNAV warfare appraisals Programming 
October-March CMC POM development Programming 
March CNO Program and Fiscal Guidance Programming 
issued 
April OPNAV Resource Sponsor Program Programming 
Proposals submitted to N80 
May DON Program Strategy Board Review Programming 
April-May DON budget guidance issued Budgeting 
Late May - early June DON POM to OSD Programming 
Late May - early June Controls issued for NAVCOMPT Budgeting 
submission 
Jun-Sept OSD Program Review Programming 
Late July - Mid August NAVCOMPT Budget Review Budgeting 
Mid - Late August Program Decision Memorandum (PDM) Programming 
issued 
Late August Secretary of the Navy decisions Budgeting 
Late August Budget guidance and controls issue for Budgeting 
OSD Submission 
15 September Budget to OSD/OMB Budgeting 
September -January OSD/OMB Budget Review Budgeting 
Early-Mid January Issue Controls and Budget Guidance for Budgeting 
President's Budget 
Early February President's Budget to Congress Budgeting 
February-September Congressional Review of Budget Budgeting 





Appendix B. POM-98 NAVY SCHEDULE OF EVENTS 
Date Events Lead Assist Originating 
Mechanism 
Sep95 Publish RAD VIINIII (DON N80 N82 Memo, Database 
FY97) Budget Estimate 
Submission 
8 Dec95 Unified CINCS submit N83 OSD Message 
Integrated Priority Lists 
Jui-Dec 95 DON Joint Mission Area/ N81 Resource 
Support (JMA/SA) Sponsors 
Assessment Process 
5,6,7,8, 11' DON JMA/SA Assessment N81/ Resource Briefing 
13,15, Dec Briefs to Integrated R3B (IR3B) USMC Sponsors 
95 
Jan/Feb Publish RAD IX/X N80 N82 Database, Memo 
96 FY 97 President's Budget 
17 Jan 96 3-Star Summary Brief of N81 Briefing 
Assessments 
19 &20 CNO/CMC Summary Brief of N81 Briefing 
Jan 96 Assessments 
23 Jan 96 DPSB Summary Brief of N81 Briefing 
Assessments 
Feb96 Component Commander Issue Comp. N83 Message/ 
Paper submission Com- POM-98 serial 
mander 
Feb 96 Claimant Issues Submitted to Claim- POM serial 
Resource Sponsors ants 
Feb 96 Baseline Assessment Various N80 POM-98 Serial 
Memoranda due to N80 
21-22 Feb DON Investment Balance N81/ Briefing 
96 Review (IBR) to IR3B USMC 
Mar96 Defense Planning Guidance DOD 
(DPG) Issued 
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Date Events Lead Assist Originating 
Mechanism 
5-14 IBR Briefing to CINCS N81/ Briefing 
Mar96 USMC 
19 Mar 96 IBR Briefing to CEB N81/ Briefing 
USMC 
20 Mar 96 IBR Briefing to ACMC N81/ Briefing 
Committee USMC 
22 Mar96 IBR Briefing to DPSB N81/ Briefing 
USMC 
Mar96 DON Programming Guidance SECNAV Memo 
Issued 
Mar96 Publish Preliminary Program N80 POM-98 Serial 
Guidance for POM-98 
-Detailed Programming guide 
-Fiscal Allocation to RSs 
Mar-Apr Build Sponsor Program RSs Database 
96 Proposals (SPP) 
Apr96 DOD Fiscal Guidance DOD/ POM-98 Serial 
- Program Guidance Revised N80 
(If required) 
Apr-May SPP Presentations to R3B & RSs Brief, Memo 
96 Backup Data Submission to 
N80 (SPPDs) 
Apr96 Database Available for N80 Memo, Database 
Claimant Review 
May96 Post-SPP Assessments Various Memo 
Submitted RSs 
May96 Brief Tentative POM-98 N80 Briefing 
(TPOM) to R3B 
May96 Brief TPOM-98 to R38 N80 Briefing 
Executive Panel 
May96 Brief TPOM-98 to CNONCNO N80 Briefing 
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---------------------------------------- ·-· 
Date Events Lead Assist Originating 
Mechanism 
May96 Brief POM-98 to DPSB N80 Briefing 
Jun 96 Final Balancing: Database N80 Database, Memo 
Lock; Publish RAD XI/XII 
(POM-98) 
Jun96 Submit POM-98 Documentation N80 WordPerfect File 
to N80 per POM-98 Transfer 
Preparation Instructions (PPI) 
Jun 96 Submit POM-98 to OSD N80 Database, Memo 
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